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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVE RICHARDS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
DIANA BROWN,

Case No. 064906011

Respondent/Appellee.

Petitioner/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Mr. Richards") submits the
following as his opening brief in the above-referenced appeal:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order of a District Court in a
domestic relations matter is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3 and 4, and U.C.A. § 78(a)-4-103(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the Trial Court commit a substantial and prejudicial
1

error sufficient to reverse and/or remand the issue when it ignored the plain language of
the Common Law Marriage Statute regarding the "termination of the relationship" and
granted summary judgment to the Respondent?
Standard of Review: To demonstrate prejudice, appellants must show
reasonable likelihood that without the error, there would have been a different result. See
Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 12 (Utah 1999). A district court's
interpretation of a statute is a legal question and therefore the standard of review is one of
correctness. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). "Correctness means the
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial
judge's determinations of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1996). Moreover,
summary judgment is also reviewed for correctness and is only appropriate "when there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Wilcox v. Anchor Waste Co., 164 P.3d 353, 356 (Utah 2007) {citing
Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002) and Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c).
When deciding whether a trial court correctly found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, the appellate court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. In Re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1
P.3d 1074, 1076 (Utah 2000) (other citation omitted).
Issue No. 2. Did the trial court err by refusing to take evidence on the disputed
fact of when "termination of the relationship" occurred under the Utah common law
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marriage statute.
Standard of Review: Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a
question of law and is therefore reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1993). When interpreting the meaning of a statute
the Court must first look to the plain language of the statute. Brinkerhoffv. Br inkerhoff,
945 P.2d 113,116 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d
1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). When there is ambiguity in the statute's plain language, that
guidance should be sought from legislative history and relevant policy consideration. Id.,
(citing World Peace Movement of America v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d, 253,
259 (Utah 1994). Summary judgment is only appropriate "when there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Wilcox v. Anchor Waste Co., 164 P.3d 353, 356 (Utah 2007) (other citations omitted) and
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Issue No. 3

Were the trial court's compounded errors harmful to the Petitioner's

claims?
Standard of Review: Utah trial and appellate courts are mandated not to disturb a
judgment unless it is clear that refusing to do so would be substantially unjust. Utah R.
Civ. P 61. ("... no error or defect in any ruling ... is ground for ... disturbing a judgment...,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice.") See also Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Revised J.
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But individual legal determinations of evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a
correction-of-error standard (cf abuse-of-discretion) and trial court's "selection,
interpretation, and application" of a particular rule of evidence is reviewed for
correctness. Dalebout v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 980 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Finally, no evidentiary challenge will be successful without also showing that an error
was harmful.
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its application of the legal
standard of unjust enrichment, as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court decision in Jeffs v.
Stubbs 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998)?
Standard of Review: The trial court is bound to follow Utah law and precedent.
The trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. Orton v.
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). As used by this Appellate Court, correctness
means that no particular deference is given to a trial court's ruling on questions of law.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). In reviewing discretionary rulings, the
appellant must show the trial court exceeded the measure of discretion allotted or
boundaries set by principles or rules of law. See generally Pena, at 936-939. In applying
a legal rule to the facts the trial court is afforded "little room to roam" in the pasture of
discretion and in essence is reviewed under a "de novo" standard. Id.
Issue No. 5: Although the trial court found Petitioner had proven unjust
enrichment as a matter of law, was its award of damages to the Petitioner arbitrary and
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capricious?
Standard of Review: When challenging discretionary rulings, the appellant must
show the trial court exceeded the measure of discretion allotted by showing the court
engaged in an arbitrary and capricious action. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993). A trial court has abused its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for
the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 860 P.2d 937? 938 (Utah 1993). Reversal is
appropriate when the decision is so unreasonable it is arbitrary and capricious. Kunzler, at
275. A finding of fact will be judged clearly erroneous if it violates the standard set by
the Appellate Court, is against the clear weight of evidence, or the reviewing court is left
with "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made," although there is
evidence to support the finding. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Court
App. 1991). The trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to
ensure the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon the
applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999).
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court err in its legal conclusion that Petitioner failed to
establish the elements of equitable property division theories, including promissory
estoppel, implied contract, and constructive trust?
Standard of Review: Legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness and
"correctness55 means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in
any degree to the trial judges determinations of law.55 State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935
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(Utah 1996). The trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to
ensure the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon the
applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Appellant sets forth in the attached Addendum the complete Code and Rule
provisions, referenced as follows:
(1)

Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), common law marriage
statute.

(2)

Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment.

(3)

Rule 26(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery protective orders.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, involving initial claims under common law
marriage and paternity. The parties separated on or about September 1, 2005, after
having lived together over 10 years. At the time of trial, they had a 12-year-old daughter.
The cohabitation was in the home of Ms. Diana Brown, Respondent, and she owned the
home separately from 1989 to 1995, when the parties began living together. In 1991,
Respondent divorced and paid her first husband $11,000 as his equity. She refused to
marry Mr. Richards, Petitioner, despite his attempts to formalize the relationship. The
Petitioner paid one-half the mortgage, household expenses, and child costs throughout the
relationship, and the parties maintained a detailed accounting of these matters. In his
Petition, Mr. Richards alleged a common law marriage existed and asserted additional
claims for paternity and equitable division of property, including equity in the home.
A Memorandum Decision re Partial Summary Judgment was entered by the trial
court on January 8, 2008. This decision held that the Petitioner's failure to file his Petition
within one year of termination of the common law marriage was jurisdictional and barred
his claim. Without taking any evidence, the court concluded that the parties' relationship
terminated on the date Mr. Richards moved out of Ms. Brown's home.
The trial court made a fatal error in granting summary judgment for the
Respondent. In light of the plain language of the statute the court could not grant
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summary judgment as a matter of law because the law required evidence to establish
"termination of the relationship" and not just the date that Petitioner vacated the shared
residence. In addition, the court refused to take evidence regarding the disputed fact of
when the "termination of the relationship" actually occurred and therefore, the court
could not grand summary judgment at all. This error by the court warrants reversal
because it was arbitrary, capricious, substantial, prejudicial, and prevented Petitioner from
a full and fair trial.
The Petitioner was thereafter limited only to his claims for paternity and equitable
theories of recovery at trial. A trial was held June 16, 2008, and on July 9, 2008, the trial
court entered its own Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which is the final
judgment and order being appealed to this Court. In its ruling, the trial court concluded
that Petitioner was entitled to compensation of $10,136 for improvements to
Respondent's home that he paid for under the theory of unjust enrichment, but the trial
court deemed compensation for his contribution to the mortgage over 10 years, which was
a stipulated sum of $71,100, as not meeting the standard of unjust enrichment, promissory
estoppel, constructive trust or implied contract. The trial court limited the evidence
presented at trial to equitable theories of recovery and refused to allow direct evidence of
common law marriage. Nevertheless, by the end of the trial, the court stated that the
parties had met the elements of common law marriage. (Transcript, p. 183). Such a
conclusion by the trial court underscores the weakness of the ruling and supports the

8

Petitioner's request for reversal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

These parties were never married and have one (1) child together, namely

Stephanie A. Brown-Richards (DOB 03-29-1996), age 12 at the time of trial.
2.

It is undisputed that the parties began living together in May 1995 and

Petitioner moved into a separate residence at the end of August 2005. (Tr. 14) During
this 10-year period, the parties resided in the home of Diana Brown at 459 - 12th Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

The Respondent, Ms. Brown, alleges that the parties had an exclusive

romantic relationship through at least the summer of 2001. Petitioner Steve Richards
alleges the parties continued an exclusive monogamous relationship and common law
marriage through December 31, 2005, and he filed a paternity and common law marriage
action December 21, 2006. (Record p.l).
4.

It is undisputed that while they lived together, the parties shared in the

payment of the mortgage expense of the residence and in division of monthly bills. The
parties faithfully accounted for their joint expenses and the joint trial exhibits contained a
sample of the monthly statements documenting specific expenses for mortgage payments,
utilities, groceries, clothes, taxes, home repair and all home and family expenses shared
by the parties over 10 years. (Joint Trial Exhibit 11-A)
5.

During the 10-year relationship, Mr. Richards was the only person who
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drove and owned a vehicle. He provided all the transportation for Ms. Brown and the
child as needed, and paid all costs of the vehicle purchase and operating expenses. (Joint
Trial Exhibit 15).
6.

It is undisputed that the parties established a joint parenting relationship

with their daughter and both contributed equally to her expenses, and shared in all aspects
of her care taking and parental matters. The parties agreed to abide by the Petitioner's
proposed "Parenting Plan," to which they slipulated as a final order at trial to resolve the
paternity and custody claims. The Parenting Plan continues the parties' obligation to
share equally in the child's direct expenses, and grants the parties joint legal and physical
custody of the minor child and an equal division of time (R. 17-22, 58-61).
7.

The parties referred to their relationship as a "marriage" and such was

recognized by third parties. The IHC Employee newsletter of May 2005 had a cover
photo of Ms. Brown, Mr. Richards, and their daughter Stephanie, referencing "Diana
Brown and her husband Steve Richards." (Joint Trial Exhibit 7). Upon separating, Ms.
Brown wrote a letter to family and friends referencing the end of their "marriage." (Diana
Brown Testimony Transcript p. 90; Joint Trial Exhibit 8).
8.

By the end of the trial, even the court was convinced that the parties had

met the elements of a common law marriage, and stated "... by both of their testimonies,
so the undisputed testimony is that the parties treated themselves, irrespective of whether
or not there is a common law marriage, which I have found there is not, for reasons that
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have nothing to do with the substance of the matter, but they certainly held themselves out
that way by the evidence that I have in front of me." (Tr. 183)
9.

Upon separation, the parties attended the class for divorcing parents and

attended mediation with Marcie Keck, where they reached agreement on parenting terms
and finances for their child. (Tr., 21, 123). They scheduled additional mediation sessions
to address financial and property issues, but Ms. Brown cancelled these sessions (Tr. 21,
22). The trial court found as follows: "Petitioner testified credibly that he did not
immediately file his Petition because he was expecting that the parties would engage in
additional mediation with a view towards resolution or reconciliation. As a result of this
delay, the Petition was not filed until December 21, 2006, more than a year after
Petitioner had moved out of the residence." (Findings, para 4).
10.

Mr. Richards asked Ms. Brown to marry him several times (Tr.19). She

refused, as she had recently been divorced from Derek Priest in September 1991.
(Divorce Decree, Joint Trial Exhibit 12). Yet, it seemed important to Ms. Brown that she
appear to be married for the sake of the child. (Tr. 21)
11.

In the divorce of Ms. Brown from Mr. Priest, she was awarded the home at

459 - 12th Avenue and agreed to pay Mr. Priest $11,800 for his equity. (Tr. 52)
12.

In the common law marriage of these parties, Ms. Brown stated to Mr.

Richards she would treat him as she had treated Mr. Priest, by paying him equity he had
earned in the home. (Diana Brown testimony, Tr. 100).
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13.

Ms. Brown testified that she believed payment by Mr. Richards towards the

mortgage was essentially the same as paying equity. (Tr. 98).
14.

During the ten (10) years they lived together, the parties were both

employed in the healthcare field, earning substantially similar incomes. The Financial
Declarations filed in the case showed Mr. Richards earned $6,131 gross monthly with
IHC in June 2007, and Ms. Brown earned $5,767 gross monthly as an R.N. in July 2007.
(Joint Trial Exhibits 10, 16).
15.

Mr. Richards alleges that during the relationship of the parties, Ms. Brown

stated he was entitled to a financial interest in the home and would be added to the title,
although she never did so. Ms. Brown acknowledged at trial, as found by the trial court,
that she made statements over the years that (1) referenced how she had dealt with her exhusband by giving him one-half the equity in the home, (2) that she would treat Mr.
Richards equitably, and (3) that she would be willing to put Mr. Richards on the title to
the house. She testified that those statements were always subject to having Mr. Richards
first pay her for one-half of her equity in the home. (Diana Brown Testimony Tr. 97-98).
Mr. Richards disputed this testimony, saying he had "no recollection" of there being a
pre-condition that he pay one-half of the equity in the house before his name could go on
the title. (Steve Richards Tr. 36, 41). Ms. Brown acknowledged she was aware it was
important to Mr. Richards to have his name on the title and that he periodically raised this
issue. Although Ms. Brown pointed to the two (2) refinances of the home as evidence
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that Mr. Richards had opportunity to arrange "to pay her for her equity," had he chosen to
do so, she also acknowledged that she never identified for Mr. Richards a specific amount
of money that would satisfy her in order to get his name on the title. (Diana Brown Tr.
99). She also acknowledged that she never seriously pursued any efforts to put Mr.
Richards on the title. The trial court stated: "The court finds the testimony of Petitioner
[Richards] to be more credible than that of Respondent [Brown] on the issue of
Respondent's representations to Petitioner that she would treat him equitably [on the issue
of his interest in the home] if they ever separated. Petitioner had never been married,
whereas Respondent had been through a divorce and a property division previously.
Respondent therefore had a greater understanding of what a 'split' between them would
entail with respect to any distribution of property." (trial court Findings, para 20).
16.

There was no dispute as to the accounting established at trial that Mr.

Richards paid Ms. Brown $71,100 specifically towards the mortgage during the 10-year
relationship, and that his investment in repairs and improvements was approximately
$12,470. (Testimony of Diana Brown, Tr. 96, testimony of Mr. Richards Tr. 25, Joint
Trial Exhibits 5,6).
17.

The parties obtained a joint appraisal on the 12th Avenue residence,

resulting in an appraised value of $425,000 at trial. (Joint Exhibit 9, Findings, R. 238).
The current mortgage balance on the marital residence was approximately $148,000,
resulting in total equity of $275,000. (Joint Trial Exhibit, 9-A, 9-B) The residence was

13

purchased December 1989 by Ms. Brown, thus the parties shared the residence for
approximately 66% of the total ownership term. Applied to the equity, this represents
$183,315 in equity accumulated during the cohabitation of the parties. An equal division
would be $91,658 to each party. (Tr. 155-156)
18.

Ms. Brown asserted that she viewed Mr. Richards as a "tenant" for part of

their 10 year cohabitation. (Tr. 104-105)
19.

The trial court found no evidence of a rental agreement between the parties.

The Court found Ms. Brown never had a lease with Mr. Richards, never declared the
mortgage contribution as rental income on taxes, never referred to him as a "tenant." On
the contrary, the trial court found undisputed evidence that during their time together the
parties viewed themselves as a "family" and presented themselves to co-workers and
associates as "husband and wife," even after their intimate relationship terminated. (Tr.
183).
20.

In the litigation, Mr. Richards requested a finding of common law

marriage, and Ms. Brown filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, stating the claim was
untimely. The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision finding that the claim failed, as
it was not filed within the jurisdictional requirements of the common law marriage
statute, which requires a filing within one (1) year of "termination" of the relationship.
The trial court based its decision solely on the finding that cohabitation ended August 31,
2005, not on any more probative analysis of when the common law relationship
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terminated under the statute. (Memorandum Decision, R. 121) The trial court also limited
evidence and argument on the elements of common law marriage at trial. (Memorandum
Decision, R. 121)
21.

Mr. Richards filed his Verified Petition December 21, 2006, and alleged the

parties' relationship ended December 31, 2005, when the parties ceased holding
themselves out as married, began to date others, and were no longer living together. Until
that time, they continued sharing holidays, he kept a key to the house and entered as
needed, the parties remained monogamous, and nothing changed as to joint parenting and
support of the child. Mr. Richards also retained Ms. Brown as beneficiary on his life
insurance and retirement accounts after separation. (Findings, para 14) (Tr. 16-18).
22.

The Verified Petition filed by Mr. Richards pled common law marriage, as

well as alternate equitable theories of recovery and property division, including implied
contract, unjust enrichment, contract for services, partnership or constructive trust.
(R.l-8)
23.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Mr. Richards had stated a

claim for unjust enrichment. The court ordered Ms. Brown to reimburse to Mr. Richards
the expenditures he made for a deck, swamp cooler, sprinkler system, and ceiling fan in
the amount of $10,136. (Findings, para 34) The Court denied any other categories of
expenditure, including the $71,100 paid towards the mortgage during the 10-year period,
any expenditure towards home maintenance, a total of $12,470, including part of the deck
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cost, lawn service costs of $1,024.50, and other repairs. (Tr. 146, Joint Exhibit 6). Mr.
Richards also quantified the costs incurred by him to purchase, insure and maintain the
only automobile used by the parties during the 10-year relationship, in the amount of
$38,565, and he requested reimbursement of half the expenditure. (Joint Exhibit 15,
Findings, para 35-39).
24.

The trial court reasoned that home maintenance expenses, such as lawn

care, do not "add value" to the home and the Court could thus not determine how these
expenses conferred a specific benefit on Ms. Brown, as required for a finding of unjust
enrichment. (Findings, para 35).
25.

The Court denied Mr. Richards' request for reimbursement for

contributions to the home mortgage on the theory that he would have incurred a housing
expense elsewhere, whether as rent or mortgage payment, if he had not been living with
Ms. Brown. The Judge reasoned that he would have had to make at least a comparable
payment for rent, although she calculates the fair rental value of the home as
approximately what he currently paid as mortgage, $650 per month. The court reasoned
that there was a failure of proof on this element of the unjust enrichment damages
because Mr. Richards provided no evidence that he had financial wherewithal to pay a
down payment or secure a mortgage solely in his name and, thus, the court could not
conclude he was in a financial position to have been able to accrue equity, but for having
been misled by Ms. Brown that he was accruing equity. This finding was made despite
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the evidence in the Financial Declarations that they earned similar incomes. The court
thus failed to reimburse Mr. Richards any of the $71,100 that he proved were direct
contributions to the mortgage during his cohabitation with Ms. Brown. (Findings, para
36-40)
26.

The court considered and rejected Mr. Richards' other theories for

recovery: Promissory estoppel, contract and constructive trust. The Judge based her
reasoning on what Mr. Richards did not do: He did not establish that his actions in failing
to establish a more formal equity interest in the property were "prudent," and thus failed
by a preponderance of the evidence to establish the elements of promissory estoppel.
(Findings para 41-42).
27.

The court denied Mr. Richards any reimbursement for contributions he

made to the relationship by allowing full use of his vehicle over a period of 10 years
without reimbursement. The court found he had failed to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that Ms. Brown received a measurable and particularized benefit through
occasional use of the vehicle, and could not find unjust enrichment. (Findings para 43)
28.

The court found Mr. Richards had no basis to assert a claim for attorney's

fees and denied that request. (Findings, para 44).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court erred in its analysis of what constitutes "termination of

relationship" under the Utah Common Law Marriage statute. That statute requires parties
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to meet the significant burden of establishing five (5) separate factors. Once established,
a common law marriage is treated for all intents and purposes as a marriage, and divorce
law is applicable upon the end of that relationship. The court herein treated as
dispositive, only one (1) of the five (5) factors, that is, the factor of ending living
together, and deemed that as termination of the relationship. There is no statutory or legal
precedent for this finding, which was made pursuant to a summary judgment motion
brought before the Commissioner. The court thereafter limited trial evidence and
discovery. Importantly, the court was nonetheless convinced that there was a common
law marriage in this case and makes this reference in the trial transcript. On this point the
parties' testimony was consistent, all exhibits were stipulated including documentation
that the parties had established a general reputation as married, and used that terminology
towards one another. Mr. Richards alleges that his moving out of the marital home
should be deemed a separation, as he was hopeful of reconciliation and the parties were
jointly engaged in mediation efforts. Mr. Richards testified that he was totally unaware
that there was a one(l) year limitation triggered by his voluntary move from the marital
residence. Mr. Richards proposes that the Court take a more probative and case-by-case
analysis of what constitutes a termination, given his strong claim to a common law
marriage, his good faith and prudent efforts towards reconciliation and resolving disputes
without litigation, and principles of equity and fairness.
2.

The trial court found Mr. Richards entitled to reimbursement of $10,136
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for improvements he made to the residence of Ms. Brown. This was reimbursement for a
deck, swamp cooler, sprinkler system, and ceiling fan. The court made this award based
on a finding that these payments represented unjust enrichment of Ms. Brown. However,
the court denied other categories of expenditures, including the undisputed payment of
$71,100 towards the mortgage during the 10-year period, and $12,470 towards home
maintenance and other repairs, stating only that these were to maintain the home and did
not "add value." It is impossible to rationalize the theory of the court in distinguishing
these categories of reimbursement. Her analysis that Mr. Richards should not be
reimbursed any portion of the equity because he did not show that he had actually applied,
or could qualify for a mortgage to refinance, makes no sense. This is especially hard to
understand, in light of the evidence that the parties made substantially equal incomes in
the health care field, and by the court's own explicit findings that there was not a
landlord/tenant arrangement; rather, that there was a marriage-like arrangement and that
Mr. Richards5 testimony was more credible on the issue of Ms. Brown's representations
to him that she would treat him equitably on the issue of interest in the home if they ever
separated, and using as an example how she had treated her prior husband by paying out
equity upon separation.
3.

The court erred in denying any relief based on the theory of promissory

estoppel, denying Mr. Richards' other equitable claims. All elements of promissory
estoppel were proven in this case, and the court's conclusions of law contradict her
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explicit findings of fact, which support application of this theory. Specifically, the court
found that Mr. Richards had not acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on the
alleged promise that Ms. Brown would put his name on the title to the home without any
preconditions. She also stated that he had not shown his reliance resulted in a loss to him.
These conclusions are directly contrary to the court's findings, which supported the
theory of unjust enrichment, in that he had added value to the home, which is conferring a
benefit to Ms. Brown, and it would be inequitable not to compensate him. It is also
contradictory to the court's finding that Petitioner's testimony was credible and that Ms.
Brown's testimony was not credible, that she intended to, but never got around to adding
him to the title, and that she was not explicit about the precondition of equity.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS ANALYSIS OF
WHAT CONSTITUTES "TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP" UNDER
THE COMMON LAW MARRIAGE STATUTE.

A.
The Court Erred As A Matter of Law When It Ignored the Plain Language
Of The Statute And Granted Summary Judgment To Respondent And Dismissed The
Petitioner's Common Law Marriage Claim.
The court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment to the
Petitioner on the issue of common law marriage. Summary judgment is only appropriate
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party would be
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Wilcox v. Anchor Waste Company, 164 p.3d
353, 357 (Utah 2007). Addendum, Rule 56 U.R.Civ.P. In this case there was no precedent
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to find that a common law marriage ended solely when living together ended. The end of
cohabitation as defined in Utah law is also disputed factually and thus is not a proper
subject for summary judgment.
The trial court ruled that the relationship between Diana Brown and Steve
Richards terminated at the end of cohabitation and further found that the end of
cohabitation was marked as the date that Mr. Richards voluntarily vacated the marital
residence. In essence, the trial court ignored the plain language of the statute and instead
elected to elevate one of the five elements required to establish a common law marriage,
that of cohabitation, into a dispositive element; and, despite disputed material facts,
concluded that the parties' relationship had terminated and that the Petitioner's filing was
untimely. The Court referred to its decision as "jurisdictional" but failed to explain the
reasons supporting the jurisdictional conclusion. This was a fatal error. Moreover, this
conclusion was contrary to the court's findings at trial. At trial, the court found credible
Mr. Richard's testimony that after he vacated the residence, he still believed the parties
would resolve matters or reconcile (Findings, para. 4); and further found that even after
the parties' intimate relationship had terminated, the parties continued to view themselves
as a family and continued to present themselves to their co-workers and associates as
"husband" and "wife" (Findings of Fact, R. 233). Therefore, the Court's jurisdictional
conclusion is unsupported by the plain language of the statute and is against the clear
weight of evidence included in the findings, and it is proper for the reviewing court to

21

determine that such a conclusion is wrong as a matter or law or presents a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Marshalling the evidence:
There is no evidence to marshal re: 1he Court's conclusion that there was no
common law marriage. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it ignored the plain
language of the statute and relied on its own determination of "termination of the
relationship" as the date the Petitioner vacated the parties' shared residence and granted
summary judgment to the Respondent. January 9, 2008 Memorandum Decision (Record:
121 - 127). In that decision, the Court affirmed the recommendation entered by the
Commissioner and concluded that under UCA 30-1-4.5(2) the determination or
establishment of a marriage under this section must occur within one year after Mr.
Richards voluntarily vacated the shared residence in August 2005 and therefore he did not
timely file his petition and any consideration of a common law marriage was barred in
this case. In affirming the recommendation of the commissioner, the court took no
additional evidence on the disputed fact of when the "termination of the relationship"
occurred and the court took no additional evidence at trial.
Utah law requires that the determination or establishment of a common law
marriage must occur either during the relationship or within one year following the
termination of that relationship. UCA § 30-1-4.5(2). Subsection (2) does not include the
word "cohabitation." Instead, cohabitation is one of the essential elements required by
Utah law to establish a common law marriage but it is an issue of first impression for this
Court to determine that the end of cohabitation is a dispositive factor in determining when
a common law marriage has terminated. The plain language included in Utah's common
law statute is termination of the relationship and not the end of cohabitation. The Court's
use of cohabitation as a dispositive factor is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute
and was an error of law.
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In this matter, the date that the relationship terminated is a disputed fact. The court
ruled that the parties 10-year period of cohabitation terminated at the end of the parties'
period of living together, that is, when the Respondent vacated the marital residence.
Cohabitation as defined in Utah case law and statutes requires living together with sexual
contact and elements of marriage like behavior such as unrestricted access to a shared
home and sharing of expenses. Haddow v. Haddow, 101 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). The trial
court found that it was undisputed that sexual contact between the parties terminated in
2001 (Memorandum Decision, Record at 122) and that the parties physically separated at
the end of August, 2005 (Id.). However, the parties greatly disputed when the end of the
relationship occurred. The court also found that Mr. Richards testified credibly that the
failure to file his Petition was due to his sincere belief that the parties might reconcile and
Ms. Brown's repeated cancellation of mediation. (Findings, para 4, Record at 229). The
record shows the parties continued most aspects of their relationship as usual even after
ceasing living together - celebrating holidays through Christmas 2005, sharing expenses,
staying monogamous. Most notably, at trial the Court also found that "the undisputed
evidence at trial was that throughout their time together Petitioner and Respondent
viewed themselves as a 'family' and presented themselves to their co-workers and
associates as 'husband' and 'wife' even after their intimate relationship had terminated."
(Findings, Record at 233, (citing Joint Trial Exhibits 7 and 8).
Utah law is clear that there are five essential elements required to prove a common
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law marriage. There is no precedent, at least that counsel could find, that determines
when or which of the five (5) factors individually or collectively establishes a common
law divorce. The Appellant submits that a fair reading and application of the statute is to
allow a party to establish termination on a case-by-case basis, using the statutory factors
as reference. Certainly the marriage should end on mutual agreement or when the ability
to consent ends, such as by formal marriage. Otherwise, Appellant submits a trial judge
should consider each case presented as to whether the factors which established the
common law status have unraveled to change the fundamental nature of the relationship
to be other than one akin to marriage. There may thus be a combination of elements as in
this case, where the parties were not living together, yet there was no change to their
monogamy, access to home, co-parenting, financial arrangements such as beneficiary
status, transportation and sharing of most expenses. Thus the marital conduct and holding
out as married continued even though living together had ceased. Given the hope of
reconciliation and mediation efforts - the separation could have been temporary - it is
inequitable to start a statute of limitations clock ticking solely based on a separation date.
This certainly frustrates the strong State policy to support marriage and to explore every
avenue to keep families intact and to preserve marital status.
There is no statutory or legal precedent requiring one factor be dispositive in
determining that the relationship has terminated. The importance of such a fair reading
and application is evident in this case: In a 10-year common law marriage, as established
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by these parties, people married under the common law statute should have the same right
to separate, to consider reconciliation, to freely negotiate and mediate as formally married
people, and without fear that a separation triggers an invisible statutory clock to bar
claims to a standard division of property accumulated together. In this case, Mr. Richards
did everything possible to protect his interests. He asked for Ms. Brown's hand in
marriage. After the parties separated, he relocated six blocks from home to continue his
familial role. He had a key to the home and entered without restriction on his access. (Tr.
16) The family continued to spend holidays and special occasions together through
Thanksgiving and Christmas, 2005. (Tr. 92) He took affirmative action to protect his legal
interests by attending the divorce education class, engaging in mediation with Marcie
Keck in August 2005, and believing there was a possibility of reconciliation he relied
upon Ms. Brown's representation that she would return to mediation until December
2005. (Tr. 21-22) As a matter of fact up to and including December 2005, Ms. Brown
continued to represent the parties as husband and wife. Although the parties may have
ceased engaging in sexual relations in 2001, the exclusive nature of their relationship
lasted at least through December, 2005.
Under the case of Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998), no single
factor is determinative to establish a common law marriage and as such, no single factor
should be determinative to establish the termination date of such marriage, or the
termination of the common law relationship. The very recent case of In Re Marriage of
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Kunz is also most instructive. In Re Marriage of Kunz, 136 P.3d 1278 (Utah App 2006).
That case involved individuals following the doctrine of plural marriage where the
Husband, who had married a woman named Janice in a civil ceremony, divorced her, but
then continued to act married by holding property together, raising children, having
conjugal relations despite having conjugal relations with other women and a subsequent
civil marriage. The court found that there was no longer a common law marriage with
Husband and Janice despite their lengthy relationship of 50 years acting married, due to
the existence of the subsequent marriage license and the fact that Husband was thus no
longer capable of giving consent. Therefore, the common law marriage in Kunz ended not
because there was no cohabitation and not because there were multiple sex partners, but
because the Husband no longer had the ability to consent to the unsolemnized marriage
after he entered into his civil marriage. The issue of cohabitation and multiple
relationships was not a dispositive factor, nor was it even a decisive fact in the analysis at
any stage.
At the end of the day, Mr. Richards acted prudently and in good faith to address
the demise of the relationship, including engaging in mediation and trying not to make the
process more adversarial by taking the Respondent to court. Moreover, but for the
court's ruling on the common law marriage, there would be no dispute as to his equity in
the marital residence and Mr. Richards would also have had a right to a fair and equitable
division of the retirement assets. It is significant in this case that the parties had a
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common law marriage, as stated by the court. (Tr. 183). There was ample evidence of
shared expenses, merging of finances, successful co-parenting, holding out to third parties
and acquiring a reputation as married. Mr. Richards clearly wanted to be married and
made the request of Petitioner several times.
Mr. Richards had no knowledge of the one-year filing requirement and certainly no
advance knowledge that the court deemed the end of living together a triggering event.
As such, Mr. Richards has been denied a basic right to have his property claims
adjudicated properly by the court, which is unfair. He is entitled to have a court examine
his unique situation to assess when the common law relationship terminated.
There is no Utah case law to indicate that the change of any single essential
element of a common law marriage, with the exception of consent, is sufficient to
terminate the marriage. Rather the statute's plain language requires a broader analysis of
how the parties established their relationship and when that relationship terminated. As
such the trial court erred in not taking any evidence on the disputed and material fact of
determining when this relationship terminated. Based on these substantive and prejudicial
errors, the trial court should be reversed and this matter remanded for additional
consideration of Mr. Richard's legal remedies for equity in the martial residence and Ms.
Brown's retirement.
B.
The Court Should Have Taken Evidence Regarding Common Law
Marriage And Should Have Found Petitioner Entitled To That Status.
The court erred in granting summary judgment against the Petitioner on the issue
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of common law marriage. The trial court never took evidence on the disputed fact as to
when the relationship terminated; rather, the trial court merely affirmed the ruling entered
by the Commissioner that the Petitioner's claim for common law marriage failed because
it was not filed within one (1) year of the relationship termination, detennined only by the
date that the Petitioner voluntarily separated and vacated the residence. The court took no
additional evidence to review the Commissioner's ruling, and the court refused any
additional evidence at trial. Nevertheless, all the Exhibits were stipulated and entered into
the record, which conclusively established a common law marriage. The court admitted
the same at trial:
"the undisputed testimony is that the parties treated
themselves, irrespective of whether of not there is a common
law marriage, which I've found there isn 'tfor reasons that
have nothing to do with the substance of the matter but they
certainly held themselves out that way by the evidence that I
have in front of me. " (Tr. 183).
This is a case where the parties clearly had a common law marriage which is
recognized even with the evidentiary limitations because the evidence was
overwhelmingly consistent and compelling. The problem is that Mr. Richards, based on
the court's errors, was not then entitled to a common law divorce and suffers significant
financial loss as a result. The evidence of common law marriage was so strong that
reviewing the evidence leads to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
Usually, the most difficult element to establish is that the parties are holding
themselves out to the community as a married couple; but, in this case, the record holds
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ample evidence of such conduct including the IHC newsletter dated May 11, 2005, with a
family photo and text which states "Diana (Brown) is shown above with her husband
Steve Richards, and daughter Stephanie Richards." (Joint Trial Exhibits No. 7).
Additionally, Exhibit No. 8 was a letter drafted by Ms. Brown in December 2005 and sent
to family and friends of the parties informing them of the parties' separation, which states
as follows: "The decision to separate was made after much effort was put into our
marriage... the research is very clear that children of divorce..." (Joint Trial Exhibits No.
8). These direct statements made by Ms. Brown about her "10-year marriage" to Mr.
Richards are in addition to the mountain of financial evidence admitted at trial that Mr.
Richards contributed equally based on a monthly invoice, regular payments to the home
mortgage, utilities, child expenses, etc.. Indeed, the parties were both registered nurses,
earning substantially equal incomes, at the time of separation and who had adjusted
financial contributions to support their joint needs many times during the relationship, as
any married couple would do. For example, during the 10 years, only Mr. Richards had a
car and he paid all costs related to car transportation for the family. The parties also
allocated tax exemptions and status to maximize financial returns, which were shared.
(Tr. 39-40, 97). Moreover, despite denying the Petitioner's Objection to the
Commissioner's recommendation granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the court is frustrated by the overwhelming evidence of the common law
relationship between these parties. This Court in Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah
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App. 1998) has held that the standard to establish a common law marriage is by
preponderance of evidence. Similarly, the case of State of Utah v Green, 99 P.3d 820
(Utah 2004) involved the polygamist Tom Green and the State's effort to prove the
existence of a valid common law marriage between he and one of his plural wives, Linda
Kunz, so he could be prosecuted for bigamy. The trial court found a valid marriage which
was upheld by the Supreme Court, when Mr. Green resided in a mobile home which was
grouped together with other trailers where various women and children lived whom he
considered his family members and visited on a rotating basis. The court found this
arrangement to meet the statutory definition of common law marriage in Utah despite the
unusual cohabitation and conjugal arrangements. Under this precedent, the Petitioner has
met his burden of proof to establish that his common law marriage existed and the court
erred to not so find.
C.
The Court Compounded Its Error When It Wrongfully Granted A
Protective Order And Thus Improperly Limited The Evidence Related To The Common
Law Facts As Applied To Petitioner's Claims And Equitable Theories.
The court granted the Respondent's Protective Order and ordered that Ms. Brown
need not answer certain discovery; specifically, admissions and interrogatories related to
what Ms. Brown believed to be common law marriage facts. That ruling therefore biased
and improperly limited the available evidence that Mr. Richards had to present on his
equitable theories.
Respondent's argument not to respond to the challenged discovery was that it was
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not relevant to the issues pending before the court, based on the court's ruling as to
common law marriage and cohabitation. The Petitioner's memorandum in response
argued that the court's ruling as to common law marriage settled only one (1) disputed
fact, that is, the date of physical separation. That the discovery sought additional
information as to the manner of acquiring properly, the handling and payment of finances
during the cohabitation, and other inquiries, which also applied to the equitable theories
presented in the case of unjust enrichment, partnership, constructive trust, and implied
contract. The discovery requests sought factual information relevant to these alternate
theories, although it may certainly have been evidence which overlapped the common law
marriage claims. Moreover, as stated in Rule 26(c) the purpose of the protective order is
to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense. The purpose is certainly not to limit relevant evidence. The standard of
relevance is extremely broad and Petitioner's discovery should not have been limited.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the lead case of State Road Commission v. Petty, 412, P.2d
914 (Utah 1942) held that discovery was to be liberally permitted where it is used to
eliminate noncontroversial matters and to identify, narrow, and clarify the issues on which
proof may be necessary. Rather than heeding that precedent, the trial court issued a
Minute Entry, which granted the Respondent's Motion for Protective Order (R. 193-195).
As such, Petitioner was significantly hampered in his presentation of complete evidence
to the trial court, even in presenting theories of unjust enrichment and promissory
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estoppel, theories which the court ultimately found relevant and applicable to this
situation.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE LEGAL STANDARD OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS STATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN
JEFFS V. STUBBS.
To state a claim for unjust enrichment in Utah, a Petitioner must establish facts

supporting three elements:
1)

A benefit conferred upon one person by another;

2)

An appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefits;

3)

The acceptance or retention of the benefit under such circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of
its value.

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) Thus, unjust enrichment occurs when a
person has and retains money or benefits that in justice and equity belong to another. In
discussing this theory, the Court of Appeals stated "by it's very nature, the unjust
enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact situations that did not fit within a particular
legal standard but which nonetheless merited judicial intervention." 970 P.2d 1245. The
Court further stated "unjust enrichment law developed to remedy injustice when other
areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible and workable
doctrine. Therefore we afford broad discretion to the trial court in its application of unjust
enrichment law to the facts.55 970 P2.d 1245.
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In the Jeffs case, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a finding of unjust enrichment
and constructive trust. Id. That case involved a dispute over occupancy of land between
21 individuals who are part of a polygamist community who built improvements on land
owned by the United Effort Plan Trust (the UEP). After trial, the court relied on an unjust
enrichment theory to hold that claimants were entitled to occupy the UEP land during
their lifetimes or to receive compensation for the improvements they made. In this case
the UEP invited members to build their homes on assigned lots representing that they
could live on the land permanently and that having a home there was "better than having
a deed". In 1986, Rulon Jeffs declared that all those living on UEP land were tenants at
will which led to the filing of the legal action claiming UEP had been unjustly enriched
by the improvements made by the tenants. The court held that unjust enrichment applied
and imposed a constructive trust in favor of the claimants.
Marshalling the evidence:
The trial court focused on what the Petitioner didn't do during the relationship
rather than applying the test to the evidence of what he did do.
1.
The court found that Petitioner never took steps to clarify his position or
secure his interest in the marital residence. For example, the court found that Ms. Brown
refinanced the home on two (2) occasions: the first was January 2001 when Ms. Brown
removed $40,128.29 in equity from the property; and the second was June 2004 when Ms.
Brown removed $25,000 in equity from the property; and the court found no evidence
that Mr. Richards shared in those equity withdrawals. Findings, Record at 234. In
addition, Ms. Brown testified that her promises and representations to Mr. Richards
regarding treating him equitably and putting him on his title were conditioned upon his
having to first pay her for one-half the equity in the home. Findings, Record at 235.
While the court specifically did not find Ms. Brown's testimony regarding her conditions
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to be credible, the court found the Mr. Richards knowingly accepted his financial
contributions to permanently improve the home but mistakenly believed that in making
such contributions he was accumulating an equity interest in the home. Findings, Record
at 236-237. Specifically, the court found several steps that Mr. Richards failed to take
including that he failed to have the home appraised...he failed to initiate any contacts with
any banks or mortgage companies to explore what would be involved in arranging for a
transfer of title to joint tenancy, co-tenancy, or some other means for securing his
interest...and he failed to capitalize on Ms. Brown's decision to refinance the home on
two separate occasions and to take those opportunities to resolve his concerns one way or
another. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Record at 237.
2.
Although the court acknowledged all Exhibits were stipulated, as to Mr.
Richards mortgage and maintenance contributions the court found many of the checks
unclear as to whether they were household improvements or other expenses not related to
an improvement to the house. Findings, Record at 239, "Although Respondent does not
challenge this evidence of payments by Petitioner, in most cases the court cannot discern
from the exhibit whether those expenses were incurred for household improvements, or
simply involved other expenses that are not related to an improvement to the house (e.g.
check #438 for $30 with a "memo" note of "bed delivery")." Findings, Record at 239.
Because there was at least one check included in Exhibit 6-B that did not appear to be for
a home improvement (check 438 with "memo" for "bed delivery") Mr. Richards failed to
meet the preponderance of evidence standard to demonstrate the unlabeled and
unexplained checks in that exhibit are for home improvements. Findings, Record at 240241.
3.
The court states the claim for unjust enrichment under Utah law that a party
bears the burden to establish (a) a benefit is conferred on another; (b) thai receiving party
had knowledge of the benefit received; and (c) under the circumstances, allowing
retention of the benefit without paying for the value would be inequitable. Conclusions
of Law, Record at 242. Then, applying that analysis, the court concluded Mr. Richards
had paid $8,895 towards a new deck and other amounts such as the $750 Mr. Richards
expended for the purchase and installation of a swamp cooler, $312 towards a lawn
sprinkler system, and $179 for the purchase and installation of a ceiling fan and
concluded it would be inequitable for Ms. Brown to retain that benefit of such
improvements without reimbursement to Mr. Richards for a sum total of not less than
$10,136.00. Conclusions of Law, Record at 242-243.
4.
Although the court found evidence of other contributions by Mr. Richards
to improvements to the house, because the court concluded Mr. Richards had failed to
meet his evidentiary burden to establish those other contributions were for home
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improvement rather than home maintenance, the court disallowed that evidence.
Conclusions of Law, Record at 243.
5.
The court acknowledged Mr. Richards' contribution of $71,100 towards the
mortgage obligation but concluded he could recover no part of those payments because he
would have had an equivalent housing expense elsewhere for rent or mortgage.
Conclusions of Law, Record at 244.
6.
The court found Mr. Richards failed in his burden to establish unjust
enrichment on the mortgage payments because, "Petitioner provided no evidence at trial
that during the time the parties were co-habiting he had the financial wherewithal either to
pay a down payment on a separate residence or to secure a mortgage solely in his name."
Conclusions of Law, Record: 245.
7.
Diana Brown testified that she viewed Mr. Richards payment toward the
mortgage as rent. Transcript, page 105.
8.
Ms. Brown testified that Mr. Richards providing all the automobile
transportation was not a benefit to her, just a convenience. Transcript, page 103, 104.
9.
Ms. Brown testified that it was fair for her to retain all increased value in
the house over ten years because Mr. Richards had not "participated in the running of the
house and paying a sum to buy into the house to make it half his own so that even when
they separated, it would be half his and they would have to either sell it or determine how
they were going to pay each other off; and further that it would have been different if
their relationship "didn't go by the wayside as it did." Transcript, page 106-107.
10.
Diana Brown testified that the monthly accounting sheets she prepared was
not intended to be a contract or proof Mr. Richards paid into the house equity but was "a
simple declaration of where the money that we were paying out was going." Transcript p.
118.
This evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's Findings and
Conclusions. In applying the theory of unjust enrichment to the facts in this case, the
three requisite elements are readily established. First, Respondent clearly received a
benefit over a period often years from Mr. Richards' faithful payment of half the
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mortgage, contribution towards home repairs, improvements and joint arrangements on
taxes. The second element is also readily established in that Respondent surely had an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefits being conferred given the joint cohabitation;
and the third element is Respondent's acceptance or retention of the benefit under
circumstances that make it inequitable to retain the benefit without payments of its value.
In this regard, Mr. Richards relied on Respondent's representation to add him to the title
which prevented his making alternate investments in real property or other avenues or
even in terminating the relationship at an earlier stage which may have occurred, but for
the deception. Other cases where the Utah Court of Appeals upheld claims of unjust
enrichment include Shoreline Development Inc v. Utah County and American Fork City,
835 P.2d 207 (Utah Court App. 1992). See also, Allen v. Hall, 148 P.3d 939 (Utah 2006).
A.
The Trial Court Erred In Distinguishing Between Home Improvement And
Maintenance Expenses.
The trial court held that Mr. Richards had proven his claim for unjust enrichment
and awarded him $10,136 in compensation for his payment for a deck, sprinkler system,
swamp cooler and ceiling fan purchased for the home of Ms. Brown. (Findings, para. 3334) She rejected claims totaling an additional $2,334 for other home expenses, arbitrarily
declaring they were mere "maintenance" and not an improvement to the home which
"added value". (Findings, para. 35). This distinction is capricious, as the maintenance
expenses were fully proven and analytically meet the three-prong test of unjust
enrichment by:
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(a) Was a benefit conferred? Yes, Mr. Richards paid for appliance repair, lawn
mowing, etc.
(b) Did Ms. Brown appreciate or know of the benefit? Yes. They were living
together and she shared some of these costs.
(c) Under the circumstances, is it inequitable to allow Ms. Brown to retain the
benefit without payment? Would a tenant or guest pay for 10 years of maintenance? Was
it a gift? No, it was done in reliance and in expectation of acquiring equity in the hom0
and to keep it well maintained.
The trial court seemingly abandons the unjust enrichment test in its application of
law to the facts to award reimbursement for some improvements and not other categories
of proven expenses that meet the three-part test, without sufficient findings or explanation
to support such conclusions. Although the concept of adding value is interesting, it is
more applicable to a divorce action where equity and expenditures are being analyzed
under divorce law and it does not fit into an unjust enrichment analysis.
Similarly, it was undisputed that Mr. Richards alone paid to purchase, insure,
repair, and fuel a car which the family used. He quantified the costs over 10 years as
$3,800.00 annually ($38,000.00 over 10 years) and requested reimbursement for one-half.
(Tr. 57-58; Joint Trial Exhibits) As demonstrated above, this expense also meets the
three-prong test of unjust enrichment and should be expenses reimbursed to Mr. Richards.
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B.
The Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Awarding $71,100.00 In Home
Equity to Mr. Richards Under The Theory Of Unjust Enrichment.
Over the 10-year relationship, it was undisputed that Mr. Richards paid $71,100 in
monthly payments towards the mortgage, and all checks were produced. (Tr. 27-28; Joint
Trial Exhibit 5, 5-A). Despite this evidence, the trial court arbitrarily denied any portion
of the claims as not proper under an unjust enrichment analysis. (Findings, para.36-40)
Appellant will state and respond to the court's reasons below:
Reason (1): Mr. Richards could have incurred an equivalent housing expense
elsewhere either as rent or mortgage. (Findings, para. 37).
Rebuttal:

This reasoning is capricious because the trial court ignores the

difference between rent and building equity. It is a critical distinction that allows Ms.
Brown and Mr. Richards to pay the same amount over 10 years, yet one has gained a
valuable investment worth $425,000 and the other has gained nothing.
Reason (2): Mr. Richards testified 1o his reliance on Ms. Brown's promises to put
him on title and assumption that he was building equity which prevented him from
investing elsewhere which the court says was not established at trial because he did not
show evidence he had a down payment or could secure a mortgage solely in his name.
(Findings, para. 38)
Rebuttal:

This reasoning is capricious because there was evidence that the

parties made equal incomes and Ms. Brown owned her own home and mortgage evidence apparently ignored by the court. Moreover, it is entirely irrelevant that Mr.
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Richards did not apply for a mortgage as he was relying on the agreement made with Mr.
Brown that he was a partner in his home - testimony from Mr. Richards the court deemed
credible (Findings, para. 20).
Unfortunately, the trial court again misses the point in the evidence or lack of
evidence she cites to support her reasoning and therefore reaches the wrong conclusion of
law. She does not even address the three prong test of unjust enrichment in considering
the claims to equity arising from mortgage payments. In fact, unjust enrichment analysis
supports an award of equity accumulated over 10 years or reimbursement of the $71,100
as follows:
(a) Was a benefit conferred? Yes. Ms. Brown paid half the mortgage yet
received 100% of the benefit of full payment. Ms. Brown owns the house. Her investment
has been preserved, protected and improved and increased in value over 10 years due to
Mr. Richards payments.
(b) Did Ms. Brown appreciate or know of the benefit? Yes. They lived
together. She made him pay half by presenting a monthly invoice to him.
(c) Under the circumstances, is it inequitable to allow Ms. Brown to retain
the benefit without payment? Yes. Mr. Richards relied in good faith; he fulfilled his
obligation in full; he did not make alternative investments; he remained in the relationship
longer.
Again, if the trial court had applied the unjust enrichment analysis to the
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undisputed evidence, Mr. Richards should have been awarded his full equity claim. The
trial court ruling should thus be reversed on this point.
C.
The Trial Court's Conclusions Regarding Unjust Enrichment Are Arbitrary
And Contrary To Other Jurisdictions That Have Applied Unjust Enrichment To Support
An Award Of Home Equity.
It is useful to review how high courts in other jurisdictions have handled the fact
situation of dividing property among unmarried cohabitants by applying unjust
enrichment and similar theories of division. These cases were filed with the trial court by
letter dated June 13,2008.
Tolan v. Kimball, 33 P.3d 1152 (Alaska 2001). This is a case involving cohabitants
over eight years where one party purchased the home titled in their sole name and where
both parties contributed to the value of the home and shared expenses. The Supreme
Court of Alaska awarded the parties an equal share of the net value of the properly at the
time of separation based on a theory that they had an "informal, express agreement" and
that the evidence showed that their investment was intended to be equal. The Court held
there was no need to establish that an actual contract between the parties existed. The
Court denied the assertion that the cohabitant without title to the home was only a
"tenant" as there was no monthly payment shown as rent on tax returns.
Cook v. Kalinyapraki 84 P.3d 27 (Montana 2004). In this case the parties were
unmarried tenants in common in the ownership of a piece of real estate. It was undisputed
that the parties agreed to split their expenses by Petitioner paying for housing and
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Respondent paying for living expenses. In addition, the parties split the proceeds from
other parties roughly equally during their relationship and made other contributions to
remodeling. In this case, the Supreme Court of Montana considered a claim of unjust
enrichment in the context of a partition action. The Court ruled that the presumption of
equal division in a partition action shifts where there is evidence of unequal contribution
and "where the relationship between the parties indicates that one might have intended to
make a gift to the other55. The Court stated "to ignore the conduct of the co-tenants during
their relationship, as such is relevant to establishing their intent as to how property held as
tenants in common is to be divided when they part ways, would be to ignore the reality
that how the parties conducted their relationship is relevant circumstantial evidence of
such intent.55 Citing In Re: State ofDern Family Trust, 928 P.2d at 152 (1996, Mont)
Thus, by dividing property which was titled together, as well as property, not titled
together, the Court found that the parties showed an intent to split their assets equally and
that there was no evidence that one party was expected to only pay rent.
Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 (2000 Colo). This case involved unmarriecj
cohabitants who lived in a jointly titled home which was transferred to the sole name of
Petitioner for financial reasons. At the time of separation there was no jointly titled real
estate. This was a partition action where the Supreme Court of Colorado considered
issues of unjust enrichment and restitution. The Court determined the parties were joint
venturers in the construction and payment of the home finding that their joint efforts
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allowed both to maintain a larger home, better lifestyle and the benefits of shared
expenses. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the worth of each party's
contribution, reasonable rental value for periods of habitation and whether the unclean
hands doctrine barred any portion of recovery.
Ulrich v. Zemke, 65 A N.W. 2d 458 (2002 Wise). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
considered a seven year period of cohabitation where the parties financietl relationship
remained constant, co-mingling of finances, shared expenses, acquiring property through
joint efforts and having two children. The Court found it immaterial that the female cohabitant did not directly participate in the acquisition and maintenance of each separate
piece of property and supported the Circuit Court's application of unjust enrichment, with
additional guidance.
Warren v. Gay, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1171 (April 13, 2006). This decision
from the Superior Court of Connecticut supported a female cohabitant's claim for
equitable relief based on alleged breach of contract by Respondent male cohabitant. The
male moved to strike her complaint based on Connecticut not recognizing common law
marriage or marital type rights arising from cohabitation. The Court granted the motion to
strike claims for palimony, and denied the motion to strike claims for constructive and
resulting trust, and accounting and unjust enrichment.
The foregoing cases show a clear and significant trend to award equity and real
property interests to cohabitants where elements of reliance can be shown, absent formal
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agreements. Similarly, the trial court herein should have recognized the equity claims of
Mr. Richards.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR IN NOT APPLYING THE
THEORY OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND NOT CONSIDERING THE
THEORY OF IMPLIED CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST TO
SUPPORT PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FOR HOME EQUITY AND A FAIR
PROPERTY DIVISION.
Similar to unjust enrichment, the theory of promissory estoppel is an equitable

remedy which applies to Respondent's situation. This is a remedy to be used where fou)r
elements can be established as follows:
1)

A person acts in reliance on a promise made by another;

2)

The promisor knew that the other party had relied on the promise which the
promisor should reasonable expect to induce action or forbearance in a
reasonable person;

3)

The promisor was aware of all material facts;

4)

A party relies on the promise and the reliance resulted in a loss to that
party.

See Youngbloodv. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. 158 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2007)
Marshalling the evidence:
Again, the trial court focused on what the Petitioner didn't do during the
relationship rather than applying the test to the evidence of what he did do.
1.
The Court denied recovery to Mr. Richards based on his claim for
promissory estoppel because the Court concluded that Mr. Richards did not carry his
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burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of evidence (1) that he acted with
prudence and with reasonable reliance on a promise made by the Respondent; (2) the
Respondent knew the Petitioner had relied on the promise which the Respondent should
reasonably expect to induce action on the part of Petitioner; (3) the Respondent was
aware of all material facts; and (4) that Petitioner relied on the promise and the reliance
resulted in a loss to him. Conclusions of Law, Record at 246.
2.
Ms. Brown testified that it was fair for her to retain all increased value in
the house over ten years because Mr. Richards had not "participated in the running of the
house and paying a sum to buy into the house to make it half his own so that even when
they separated, it would be half his and they would have to either sell it or determine how
they were going to pay each other off; and further that it would have been different if
their relationship "didn't go by the wayside as it did." (Tr. 106-107).
The evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's Findings and
Conclusions. Promissory estoppel is also applicable given the representation that
Respondent made to Petitioner concerning future transfer of the real property to his name
and joint title. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the measure of damages in such
actions is "the reasonable value of what Petitioner has done" Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d
205(Utah 1976). In this case, the trial court found the Petitioner's testimony regarding
promises made to him by the Respondent more credible than the Respondent's testimony
regarding the same. Moreover, the Petitioner added directly to the value of the residence
over a period often years by contributing approximately half of the mortgage payments
due during that time, by paying significant sums towards improvements, repairs and
assisted Respondent in obtaining tax benefits from the property. The Petitioner's
contribution was thus equal to that of Respondent's during the ten year span and
Petitioner requested that he be awarded one-half the appreciation of the property acquired
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during the term of his occupancy, in the amount of $91,658.00. Alternatively, Petitioner
sought return of his actual mortgage and improvements paid to Respondent.
This evidence also supports a finding that Petitioner had an implied contract with
Respondent to pay him equity upon separation and other claims. Davies v. Olson, 1A6
P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) According to the Second Restatement of Contracts, a contract
implied in fact is a "contract" established by conduct.
This evidence also supports a finding that Petitioner established a constructive
trust as a matter of equity. Courts recognized a constructive trust where there has been
(1) a wrongful act, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) specific property that can be traced to
the wrongful behavior. Such trust are usually imposed where injustice would result if a
party were able to keep money or property that rightfully belonged to another. Wilcox v.
Anchor Waste Co,, 164 P.3d 353, 362 (Utah 2007). Notably, in this case, and after the
trial court granted summary judgment on the Petitioner's claim for relief under the
common law marriage statute, per se, the required confidential relationship emerged
between these parties. This doctrine rests upon the principle of inequality between the
parties and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over another.
In the Matter of Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah App. 1988)
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred as a matter of law to grant summary judgment, which barred
presentation of the common law marriage issue at trial. This error was substantial and
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prejudicial to the Petitioner and warrants reversal. The statute requires that the
determination of a marriage under this statute must occur during the relationship or within
one year following the "termination" of that relationship. Ignoring the statute's plain
language, the trial court arbitrarily ruled that termination meant the date when parties
ceased living together. The plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and
requires a broader analysis to determine when the relationship terminates; and further no
single factor is dispositive on that issue.
Although the court concluded as a matter of law that Petitioner was entitled to
compensation under the theory of unjust enrichment, and because he had demonstrated a
preponderance of evidence of such at trial, the trial court then arbitrarily misapplied the
legal theory to deny recovery for anything other than what the court deemed to be a
"home improvement" including home maintenance expenses, contributions to the
mortgage over a period of 10 years, and maintenance of transportation during the
relationship. If the court had correctly applied the unjust enrichment test as set forth in
Utah law, the clear and uncontroverted evidence at trial demonstrated that Petitioner
proved compensatory amounts in these other categories, which should have been awarded
to him.
Relying upon its error in granting summary judgment and compounding the harm
to Petitioner, the trial court also granted a pre-trial protective order, which improperly
limited the Petitioner's discovery requests for information to establish not only common
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law marriage issues, but also evidence relative to his alternate equitable theories.
Ultimately, and in spite of the limitation on evidence, the trial court found that Petitioner
and Respondent were in a "family" and "marriage like" relationship, but without the
common law marriage remedies available to him, Petitioner had not succeeded in proving
that his contributions to the mortgage and expenses of Respondent's household over a
period of 10 years was sufficient to support his claims under promissory estoppel, unjust
enrichment, constructive trust, or implied contract. This result was because the trial court
improperly limited the discovery and presentation of evidence on these theories. This
result is capricious and lacks confidence and is, therefore, reversible error. Therefore, this
Court should reverse the trial court's decision and permit the Petitioner a fair trial; or in
the alternative this result should be remanded and the trial court and direct entry of
judgment for Petitioner for reimbursement of amounts paid towards the Respondent's
mortgage, maintenance, transportation, and should award to Petitioner his attorney's fees
incurred herein.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of February, 2009.
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Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)746-7443
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ADDENDUM

1.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, July 9, 2008.

2.

Memorandum Decision (as to Common Law Marriage claim),
January 8, 2008.

3.

UCA § 30-1-4.5, Utah Common Law Marriage statute.

4.

Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment Rule.

5*

Rule 26 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Protective Orders.
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Addendum No. 1

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Order,
Entered July 9, 2008

FILES 0ISTRSCT CSORT
Third Judicial District

JUL - 9 2008
fAKE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

STEVE RICHARDS,
Petitioner,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and ORDER

vs.

Case no. 064906011

DIANA BROWN,
Respondent.

Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

The Court conducted a bench trial in this case on June 16, 2008. Petitioner Steve
Richards was present and represented by his counsel, Suzanne Marelius. Respondent Diana
Brown was present and represented by her counsel, Tineke E. Van Dijk. The Court received the
testimony of the parties and the trial exhibits submitted by stipulation. Having considered all the
evidence the Court now enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

These parties never married, but began living together in 1995, a daughter, Stephanie,

was born March 29, 1996.
2.

During their ten years together, the parties resided in a house that was owned by

Respondent and which she had received as part of a divorce settlement from her former spouse.
Respondent had purchased the property on 12th Avenue in Salt Lake City with her then-husband
Erik Priest on or about December 1989. Respondent and Mr. Priest divorced in September 1991.
On or about that time (and in connection with Respondent's divorce from Mr. Priest), the parties
asked a mortgage company "figure out" their equity in the house. Respondent and Mr. Priest
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relied upon the mortgage company's assessment of their equity as the basis for their property
settlement; they did not have the home independently appraised. Based on the figures developed
by the mortgage company, Respondent "paid-off' Mr. Priest's equity interest m the home.
3.

The parties separated in August 2005 when Petitioner moved out. Petitioner rented a

residence six blocks away from Respondent's home in order to be close enough to help care for
Stephanie. Petitioner pays $750 per month foi his present residence, which he shares with his
now-fiancee.
4.

Shortly after the parties separated in 2005 they went to mediation with Marcie Keck to

address the custody issues; those issues were fully resolved in mediation. Petitioner testified
credibly that he did not immediately file his Petition because he was expecting that the parties
would engage in additional mediation with a view towards resolution or reconciliation.1 As a
result of this delay the Petition was not filed until December 21,2006, more than a year after
Petitioner had moved out of the residence.
5.

Petitioner's "Verified Petition for paternity and related matters" stated three claims for

relief:
(a) a declaration of his paternity over the parties' minor child, Stephanie and for joint
legal and physical custody arrangement;
(b) declaration of a common law marriage; and

Petitioner testified (without contrary testimony from Respondent), that the parties had
anticipated going back to mediation to resolve their property dispute. However, Petitioner
testified that Respondent "backed out"of the second round of mediation
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(c) equitable division of property in which parties resided based on partnership, implied
contract for services, and/or constructive trust.
6.

Respondent, Ms. Brown, agreed with paternity and joint legal/physical custody, but

denied the common law marriage claim alleging it was untimely; she also argued that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to determine a contract basis for apportionment of equity related to home
unless it pertained to paternity or some form of divorce action.
7.

By stipulation of the parties, Temporary Orders entered in this case established Petitioner

as the legal parent of Stephanie, and awarded the parties joint legal/physical custody. The
Temporary Orders adjudicated all child related issues between the parties, but reserved for trial
Petitioner's claim for equitable division of property.
8.

Thereafter, Respondent brought a motion for partial summary judgment asking the Court

to declare that the parties did not have a common law marriage. The Commissioner agreed and
recommended that summary judgment be granted and the claim dismissed. Petitioner objected;
the Court affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. At that point, only Petitioner's
equitable division claim remained to be adjudicated. The Commissioner certified that issue for
trial.
9.

The parties are both trained as nurses, although Petitioner no longer works in that

capacity.2 The parties met when they while working as nurses at Primary Children's Medical
Center. Respondent was married at time and testified they were friends. Eventually she divorced

Petitioner subsequently became employed as a clinical software consultant with
Intermountain Health Care.
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at or about the time Petitioner moved out of the area; when Petitioner moved back to Salt Lake
City some years later, they moved in together. The parties had relatively comparable levels of
earnings.
10.

Although the parties shared living expenses, they never combined their bank accounts.

Instead, Respondent kept detailed written twice-monthly tallies of expenditures incurred (e.g.,
food, utilities, insurance, house security, cable, Stephanie's expenses, birthday gifts, etc). See Ex.
11-A. The expenditure tallies also included household maintenance expenses (e.g., lawn
maintenance, appliance repair, etc). The parties' practice was that twice a month Respondent
would present these hand-written tallies to Petitioner and he would then pay Respondent, for onehalf of those costs.3 Petitioner testified, without challenge by Respondent, that whatever costs
she identified in the twice-monthly tally sheets, he "paid without question."
11.

Both parties testified that the tallies were not exhaustive-that is, there were some

purchases or other expenditures that were not included in the twice monthly tallies-but the
parties either shared those costs equally or would alternate paying those expenses so as to
equalize between them the costs involved in maintaining their family lifestyle. For example,
Petitioner's unchallenged testimony was that he contributed significant funds to major and minor

3

Because it is her practice to purge her records on a regular basis, Respondent no longer
has record of all of the twice-monthly expense tally sheets that she maintained during the course
of their 10 year relationship. That said, Respondent admits that she prepared the tally sheets
twice monthly and that they would regularly meet to reconcile accounts. Respondent does not
contest Petitioner's assertions as to the pattern and practice of their money management
throughout the relationship. Respondent further agrees that the tally sheets produced as exhibits
at trial were representative of, and consistent with, those presented to the Court at trial.
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house improvements such as a new replacement deck for which Petitioner paid $8895.00,4
$312.00 towards a lawn sprinkler system, and $179.00 for the purchase and installation of a new
ceiling fan.
12.

In addition to the above stated sharing of expenses, the undisputed evidence is that from

the time he moved in, Petitioner also voluntarily gave Respondent money towards the monthly
mortgage expense. When he first moved in, he paid $400 per month towards the mortgage.
When Stephanie was born, Petitioner on his own increased his contribution to $550 per month.
Later, when he got a raise, he again voluntarily increased the monthly payment to $650. On
some occasions Petitioner would write his check directly to Countrywide, Respondent's
mortgage company; other times he would simply write out the check directly to Respondent, at or
about the time he also paid his one-half share of the other living expenses (per the tally sheets).
13.

Although he acknowledged that his monthly "house" payments were less than half of the

monthly mortgage obligation, Petitioner testified that he was making "other contributions" to
equalize the family's expenses.5 At trial, Respondent admitted that Petitioner's financial

Respondent testified that she had paid for one half of the deck costs, but could produce
no evidence to support her claim. In contrast, Petitioner has documentary evidence of nearly
$9,000 he paid for the deck, and his testimony that this represented payment in full for the deck.
The Court gives no credence to Respondent's testimony on this issue. According to Respondent,
she "didn't know" whether the new deck added any value to the house. While it is true that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the exact amount of value that the new deck added
to the home, there is more than adequate evidence to establish Respondent's financial
contribution to home improvements (as contrasted with home maintenance) in considering
Petitioner's equitable claims.
5

For example, Petitioner brought a car to the relationship, and his vehicle (which he
maintained and insured without financial contribution by Respondent) was used for shopping, to
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contribution to the home and family was equal to her own.
14.

At trial Respondent argued that Petitioner's monthly payments towards the mortgage was

nothing more than "rent'5 from a "tenant." Nevertheless, she admitted that at no time did she ask
Petitioner for nor did she negotiate a specific housing payment with him. She admitted that she
never presented Respondent with a rental agreement and she never declared the moneys she
received from him in her taxes as "rental income." Respondent also admitted that at no time
during their 10 years of co-habitation did she ever refer to Petitioner as her "tenant" or to the
money she was receiving from him monthly as "rent." On the contrary, the undisputed evidence
at trial was that throughout their time together Petitioner and Respondent viewed themselves as a
"family" and presented themselves to their co-workers and associates as "husband" and "wife,"
even after their intimate relationship had terminated.6 See, e.g., Ex. 7, Ex. 8.
15.

At the time Petitioner moved in with Respondent, Respondent's monthly mortgage

payment was $1187.00 per month. That amount increased to $1197.00 per month in January

take family outings, and to transport Stephanie to various activities. Petitioner did all the driving
because Respondent did not own a car nor had a drivers' license during their relationship.
Petitioner acknowledged that Respondent's primary means of transportation did not involve his
vehicle; rather, she used a bus pass, taxis, etc. Although Petitioner conceded that Respondent
"almost exclusively used the bus to get to work" (while he drove to work), he nevertheless
maintains he provided the "family transportation" and should now be credited for that financial
contribution. The Court finds that while Petitioner provided a general benefit to the family when
he used his car to transport Stephanie to an event, or the family on an outing, the substantial
majority of expenses he incurred to maintain the vehicle were expenses that he would have
incurred whether or not the parties had co-habited.
6

For example, Respondent remained as a beneficiary in at least some of Petitioner's
retirement accounts (along with their daughter, Stephanie).
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1997; increased again in January 1998 to $1226.00, then adjusted down to $1180. In October
1998; again adjusted downward in November 1999 to $1173.00. Respondent refinanced the
property in Jan. 2001, paying off the one mortgage balance of $118,871.71. Ex. 9-B. It appears
that as part of the refinancing Respondent took $40,128.29 in equity out of the property, because
the new mortgage was for $159,000, with monthly payments of $1468.88. In May 2002, the
monthly mortgage payment increased to $1497.00; it increased again in March 2003 to $1516.13.
That mortgage was paid-off in June 2004 in the amount of $148,045.67 when Respondent again
refinanced her home. As with the prior refinancing, the new mortgage of approximately
$172,900 exceeded the pay-off amount by approximately $253000.7 Ex. 9-A. Based on this
evidence it appears that Respondent again took money out of the equity accrued in the home.
There is no evidence that Petitioner shared in those equity withdrawals.
16.

Petitioner testified that there were "several times" during their life together when he "felt

insecure about [his] financial position and [his] position in the family".8 According to Petitioner,
Respondent had "recognized my insecurity" and had referenced how she had treated her exhusband fairly and paid him when he moved out. According to Petitioner, Respondent told him
that if they ever split, he [Petitioner] would be treated the same-that is, he would get an interest
in his contribution to the home. Based on those representations Petitioner believed he and

7

Based on trial ex. 9-A, it appears that as of April 14, 2008, the outstanding balance on
this latest mortgage (with Citicorp Trust Bank) is $148,909.66.
8

The parties began discussing having Petitioner's name on the title of the house
approximately 6 months after Stephanie was born.
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Respondent had an agreement that in the event of a split he would get uat least partial equity" in
the home, based on his contributions. He testified that he considered the twice monthly tallysheet accountings to be the parties' record of his contributions and interest in the home. For her
part, Respondent testified that the twice-monthly accounting sheets were "not to show
[Petitioner's] payments towards equity in the home," but rather, to respond to Petitioner's request
for clarification as to "where the money was going" monthly.
17.

Respondent acknowledged at trial to having made statements over the years (a) that

referenced how she had dealt with her ex-husband, (b) that she would treat Petitioner equitably,
and (c) that she would be willing to put Petitioner on the title to the house, she testified that those
statements were always subject to having Petitioner first pay her for one-half of her equity in the
home. Petitioner disputed Respondent's testimony, saying he had "no recollection" of there being
a pre-condition that he pay Respondent one half of the equity in the house before his name could
go on the title.
18.

Respondent acknowledged she was aware it was important to Petitioner to have his name

on the title, and that he periodically raised this issue. Although Respondent pointed to the two
re-financings of the house as evidence that Petitioner had opportunity to arrange "to pay her for
her equity" had he chosen to do so, she also acknowledged that she never identified for Petitioner
a specific amount of money that would satisfy her in order to get his name on the title. She also
acknowledged that she never seriously pursued any efforts to put Petitioner on the title.9

9

The parties testified that on one occasion Respondent brought home some paperwork to
refinance the house. However, Petitioner testified that "two days later" the papers were "gone"
-8-

19.

Both parties testified that the issue of putting Petitioner's name on the house title became

an increasing source of contention between them over time. Petitioner also testified that if he had
known Respondent wouldn't follow through with her representations regarding his equity interest
in the house, he "would have made different financial choices." For her part Respondent testified
that if, at the beginning of the relationship, Petitioner had written a check towards the equity "I
would have honored that commitment." However, as difficulties mounted in their relationship
and their arguments increased, Respondent stated she felt "less inclined" to include Petitioner on
the title to the house.
20.

The Court finds the testimony of Petitioner to be more credible than that of Respondent

on the issue of Respondent's representations to Petitioner that she would treat him equitably (on
the issue of his interest in the home) if they ever separated. Petitioner had never been married,
whereas Respondent had been through a divorce and a property division previously. Respondent
therefore had a greater understanding of what a "split" between them would entail with respect to
any distribution of property.
21.

The Court does not find credible Respondent's testimony that she always conditioned her

statements to Petitioner on his paying her for one-half of the equity in the home. Rather, the
Court finds that as difficulties mounted between them, Respondent never clearly conveyed her
position with respect to what interest in the home, if any, she was willing to convey to Petitioner,
nor did she clearly specify what he had to do to secure that interest. Nevertheless, Petitioner

and nothing was ever done. Nevertheless, Petitioner testified that the fact that she had brought the
papers home reassured him that "she understood his concern."
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knowingly accepted his financial contributions that permanently improved the home. As more
fully explained below, the evidence clearly establishes that Petitioner paid for significant
improvements to the home premised on his mistaken belief that he was accumulating an equity
interest in the home.
22.

For his part, Petitioner never took the initiative to ensure that steps were taken to clarify

his position or secure his interest. Although the parties agree that the issue of Petitioner's name
on the home's title was an important matter to him, during their time together Petitioner never
took affirmative steps to have the home appraised. Therefore, there is no information available
by which the Court can assess how his various contributions enhanced the value of the property.
Similarly, he never initiated contacts with any banks or mortgage companies to explore what
would be involved in arranging for a transfer of title to joint tenancy, co-tenancy, or some other
means for securing his interest. The closest the parties ever came to any such efforts is
referenced at note 9, supra, when Respondent brought home some papers for a possible
refinancing that was intended to include Petitioner as an equity interest holder. During the entire
time that Petitioner and Respondent co-habited, Respondent refinanced the home twice but
Petitioner apparently chose not take those opportunities to resolve his concerns one way or
another.
23.

The parties began experiencing difficulties in 2001, which were exacerbated by their

dispute over the house.10 They began sleeping in different parts of the house. While there was

10

Respondent testified that Petitioner "stopped doing anything in the house" and stopped
participating in making joint decisions for the care of Stephanie Although Respondent
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disputed testimony regarding the reasons for the separate sleeping arrangements, it is clear that
the parties' intimate relationship terminated sometime around that time. In any event, it
terminated substantially earlier than when Petitioner actually moved out in Aug. 2005.
24.

Respondent testified that between the time of her divorce in 1991, and the time Petitioner

moved in (in 1995), she had a tenant for six months. The tenant was a friend; Respondent did
not enter into a formal tenancy agreement with the tenant, but he paid her $300 per month to rent
her basement.
25.

As part of these proceedings the home at issue was appraised. The appraisal was

completed on March 17, 2008 and concluded that the present market value of the home is
$425,000. Neither party has contested the home's current value.
26.

Although the Court has before it evidence of the present value for the home, no evidence

was presented as to the actual value of the home on or about August, 1995, when Petitioner
moved in, or of its value in August 2005, when Petitioner moved out. Indeed, there is no
evidence before the Court as to what the house's value was in 1991 when Respondent and her

acknowledged that Petitioner "agreed with all her decisions regarding Stephanie and attended her
activities, Respondent claims "he did not show interest in participating in the decision-making."
Petitioner strongly disputes Respondent's claims in this regard. He acknowledges that even after
there no longer was a romantic relationship between the two of them, they maintained a "cordial
relationship in which they each participated" in Stephanie's life and activities. After hearing the
testimony, observing the parties' demeanor, and making assessments of credibility, the Court
does not find Respondent's contentions to be credible, at least not with respect to Stephanie.
While the Court cannot determine the extent to which Petitioner did (or did not) contribute to the
maintenance of the home after the parties began experiencing difficulties, throughout the course
of this case it has been evident that Petitioner is (and has been) very interested in participating
fully in his daughter's life.
-11-

first husband were divorced. Although they could have done so as part of the appraisal
completed in March 2008, apparently neither party requested that the appraiser conduct
retrospective appraisals of the property for any of those relevant times.
27.

Petitioner has presented the Court with detailed exhibits, not contested by Respondent,

that over the years Petitioner paid her $71,100.00 in monthly payments towards the mortgage, see
Ex.5; $960.03 towards "home maintenance," and $1,024.50 towards "lawn service." Ex.6-A.
Petitioner also presented evidence (through photocopies of tissue copies of checks he'd written)
of paying another $12,470 in other house expenses. The largest share of those is attributable to
the nearly $9,000 in deck-related payments. Ex. 6-B. Although Respondent does not challenge
this evidence of payments by Petitioner, in most cases the Court cannot discern from the exhibit
whether those expenses were incurred for household improvements, or simply involved other
expenses that are not related to an improvement to the house (e.g, check #438 for $30 with a
"memo" note of "bed delivery"). In most cases there is no "memo" notation that explains the
purpose for the expenditure; in many cases, the handwriting and/or amounts shown are difficult
to discern clearly.11
28.

Of the various checks included in exhibit 6-B, there was direct trial testimony only with

respect to two checks-#s 253 and 257-which Petitioner expressly identified as being the checks

n

The exhibit consists of photocopies of "tissue paper" checks which the drafter keeps for
record-keeping purposes.
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he wrote to pay for the deck.12 Although there was no testimony offered as to checks #106 and
#111, the exhibit copy of #111 shows "swamp cooler" written in the "memo" section of the
check; the check is written in the amount of $250. While this check does not expressly state that
this expenditure was a purchase, the check carries a date of Sept 14, 2002. Exhibit 6-A then
shows that beginning 2003 there are more modest entries for "home maintenance" of a swamp
cooler. There are no entries related to a "swamp cooler" dating earlier than September 2002.
Check #106 includes a notation in the "memo" section that appears to read "Art Thoen." That
check was written on Sept. 2, 2002 to Ace Conditioning & Heating, LLC, the same entity to
which check #111 was written. Based on this evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, the Court believes it is more probable than not that the two checks-totaling
$750-were for a home improvement expenditure (i.e., the purchase and installation of a swamp
cooler), rather than simply a maintenance expense. The Court notes that both of these household
improvement expenditures, as well as others (e.g., the purchase and installation of a ceiling fan),
were incurred after the parties' began experiencing difficulties in their relationship and had
ceased their romantic involvement with each other.
29.

The Court cannot, however, draw a similar conclusion from the remaining checks shown

in exhibit 6-B. Two of those checks (#284 and 376) were written to a "Bill Maynard" and
total$725.00. However, there was no testimony establishing who "Bill Maynard" is nor what

12

Although the copy of check #253 has VOID written across it, Petitioner testified that
was an overwrite of another check (252) which he had voided. According to Petitioner, check
#253 itself was not voided but was, in fact, negotiated. Respondent presented no contrary
evidence on this issue so the Court accepts Petitioner's testimony on this matter.
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those expenditures were for. Similarly, check #444 is written to "Ron Slough" in the amount of
$84. There is no notation as to the purpose of that expenditure. Given that there is at least one
check included in this exhibit (check #438) does not appear to be for a home improvement, the
Court cannot conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that those unlabeled and unexplained
checks are directly related to home improvements.
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
30.

Utah law is clear that a trial court faced with a claim for equitable division of property

must first determine "what property is premarital and what property is marital." Walters v.
Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The home purchased by Respondent with her first
husband, and which she acquired after purchasing her first husband's equity interest at the time
of the divorce, is clearly "premarital" property. As a general rule, "premarital property is viewed
as separate property, and equity usually requires that 'each party retain the separate property he or
she brought into the marriage.'" Id9 quoting Haumont v Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). The rule "is not invariable" and the court must "consider all of the pertinent
circumstances." Walters, 812 P.2d 64. Here, the posture of this case clearly affects the analysis
the Court must follow.
31.

As referenced earlier, these parties never married/so there is no clear "marital" estate to

divide. When the parties resolved their custody issues through mediation and the Court
determined that Petitioner's common law marriage claim failed, this case lost its character as a
"domestic" case Nevertheless, because Petitioner had also included a third, "civil," claim
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raising various equitable theories, the case continued to trial.13 Although the Petition alluded to
various theories, in her closing argument Petitioner's counsel abandoned all theories except two:
unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.
32.

For various reasons more fully discussed below, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner

is entitled to any share of equity in the home. However, the Court concludes that he has stated a
claim for unjust enrichment.
33.

To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Utah law, Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing (a) that he conferred a benefit on Respondent, (b) that Respondent appreciated or
had knowledge of the benefit received, and (c) that, under the circumstances, allowing
Respondent to accept or retain that benefit without paying for its value would be inequitable.
At a minimum, the evidence establishes that Petitioner paid $8895 towards a new deck for the
home. Although there is no evidence regarding what value the deck added towards the overall

Respondent argued repeatedly that with the resolution of the paternity issue and
dismissal of the common law marriage claim, there was no legal "hook" on which to base
Petitioner's equitable claim to an interest in Respondent's premarital property. Respondent's
argument appears to be premised on her assumption that Petitioner's equitable claim is based on
this being solely a "domestic" case. But, the Petition clearly raises three separate causes of
action-two of which are "domestic" in character, and one of which is "civil" in character, raising
claims of unjust enrichment and/or promissory estoppel, among others. Under the rules of civil
procedure, "ftjhe plaintiff in his complaint. . . may join either as independent or as alternate
claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing
parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 18(a). Alternatively, Petitioner certainly could have filed a separate
civil action alleging unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, and then moved to consolidate
the action. See Utah R. Civ. P. 42(a). Thus, while the Court agrees that Petitioner may not have
a right to an equitable interest in her premarital property, Petitioner has an adequate legal basis
for pursuing his equitable civil claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. To the
extent he prevails in those claims, he can certainly pursue his judgment against any assets held by
Respondent.
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value of the home, there is no doubt that the $8895 was a benefit conferred upon Respondent,
and one of which she had knowledge and appreciated as a benefit. Based on the above-stated
Findings of Fact, the Court concludes it would be inequitable to allow Respondent to retain the
nearly $9,000 benefit Petitioner conferred on her by paying for a new deck without reimbursing
him for that cost he incurred.
34.

A similar analysis applies to other home improvements paid for by Petitioner,

specifically, the $750 he expended for the purchase and installation of a swamp cooler and
related costs, $312.00 towards a lawn sprinkler system, and $179.00 for the purchase and
installation of a ceiling fan. The Court concludes that, in total, Petitioner benefitted
Respondent's residence in the amount not less than $10,136.00. Therefore, Respondent should be
held responsible for reimbursing Petitioner in full for that benefit.
35.

Although there is some evidence Petitioner actually contributed greater amounts than that

towards improvements that could reasonably be expected to increase the value of the home, the
Court cannot conclude that Petitioner met his burden of proof as to those greater amounts.
Specifically, the Court has determined that of the $960.03 referenced in Ex. 5 as "Steve's
contribution" to "home maintenance," $491.25 was properly an improvement to the home rather
than just maintenance, but $468.78 cannot be so considered and is therefore disallowed. The
Court also disallows Petitioner's contribution of $1,024.50 towards a "lawn service" as
referenced in Ex. 5. The Court classifies this as a home maintenance expense. While home
maintenance expenses tend to contribute to maintaining the overall value of the home, they do
not generally enhance that value. Therefore, the Court concludes that it is unable to estimate how
-16-

those expenses conferred a specific benefit upon Respondent which in fairness she should be
required to repay.
36.

A closer issue is whether, under an unjust enrichment theory, Petitioner should be entitled

to claim reimbursement (or a share in the equity of the home) for some or all of the documented
$71,100.00 which he paid Respondent towards the mortgage during their 10 year co-habitation.
The Court concludes that Petitioner may not recover any part of those payments.
37.

Petitioner is not entitled to full credit for those payments because, if he had not been

living with Respondent, Petitioner would have incurred a housing expense elsewhere-whether as
rent or as a mortgage payment. Thus, he would have had to make at least comparable-if not
greater-payments elsewhere. If those payments had gone for rent, no equity would have accrued
to Petitioner. Although there is limited evidence before the Court regarding how his payments
compare to fair rental value for the home, the best evidence of how Petitioner valued the cost of
his housing is shown by the amounts he actually paid Respondent towards the mortgage. Prior to
Petitioner moving in, Respondent had rented a portion of her home for $300 per month. When
Petitioner moved in a few years later, he began paying Respondent $400 per month. Thereafter,
he periodically increased those payments-first to $550, and then to $650 per month. After
moving out of the home, Petitioner rented an apartment for which he currently pays $750 per
month. Thus, it appears that the amounts Petitioner contributed monthly are in line with what his
rental costs would have been if he had rented a house or apartment somewhere close-by to where
his daughter was living.
38.

Petitioner claims that if he had understood he was not accruing equity he would have
-17-

organized his finances in some other fashion, and perhaps purchased a separate residence.
Petitioner's statements of intent notwithstanding, the Court cannot give great credence to those
claims. The fact is that Petitioner provided no evidence at trial that during the time the parties
were co-habiting he had the financial wherewithal either to pay a down payment on a separate
residence or to secure a mortgage solely in his name. Moreover, Petitioner's failure to take any
steps to address an issue which he has testified was of such importance to him (i.e., the
opportunity to accrue equity in a home), suggests that Petitioner was not in a position to make his
desires a reality by qualifying for a separate mortgage.14 Thus, the Court cannot conclude that
Petitioner was in a financial position where he would have been able to accrue equity at a
separate residence had he not been misled by Respondent. Even if he had presented adequate
evidence to prove he could have purchased a residence, the Court concludes that Petitioner has
failed to prove that he would have accrued $71,100.00 worth of equity in a residence. Because
there is no evidence of attempts by Petitioner to negotiate a mortgage, it is totally speculative
what type of mortgage he would have qualified for, and what portion of his monthly payments
would have gone towards equity-accruing principal versus debt service on the mortgage.
Therefore the Court cannot begin to assess what portion of those payments could have created a
partial equity interest for Petitioner had they been re-directed to purchasing a separate residence.
39.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that any portion of the $71,100 in payments he made to Respondent unjustly enriched

14

Support for this conclusion is found in the fact that Petitioner is still renting, instead of
purchasing, a residence.
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her to his detriment, and that in fairness and equity he should be reimbursed for those payments.
40.

The Court also concludes that the remaining expenses for which Petitioner claims

credit-specifically, the majority of home maintenance and lawn service expenses-fall in the
category of normal living expenses. These expenses yielded no measurable long-term
enhancement to Respondent's equity in the home. Thus, the Court cannot find that Respondent
was unjustly enriched by those expenditures incurred by Petitioner.
41.

Petitioner's other theory for recovery is promissory estoppel. To state a claim for

promissory estoppel Petitioner must allege four elements: (1) that he acted with prudence and in
reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant, (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff
had relied on the promise which the defendant should reasonably expect to induce action on the
part of Petitioner; (3) the Respondent was aware of all material facts; and (4) that Petitioner
relied on the promise and the reliance resulted in a loss to him. The Court is not persuaded that
Petitioner has carried his burden of proof to establish these elements by a preponderance of the
evidence. But, even if the Court were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Respondent in
fact promised Petitioner that she would put his name on the title to the home without any
preconditions, and that she was aware of all material facts at the time she made that promise, the
Court still concludes that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of establishing the other two prongs
of promissory estoppel. Specifically, Petitioner has not shown he acted with prudence and in
reasonable reliance of the alleged promise, nor has he shown that his reliance resulted in a loss to
him.
42.

As reflected in the Court's Findings of Fact, there is no evidence that Petitioner's actions
-19-

were "prudent." The Court believes that reasonably prudent person concerned with establishing
an equity interest in a property into which he was investing funds would not have merely relied
upon another to take the necessary steps to perfect that interest. Here, however, Petitioner took
no such action to clarify what interest, if any, he was acquiring, nor to ensure that legal steps
were taken to establish that interest. Similarly, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner's
various payments towards the mortgage or living expenses resulted in a loss to him. As noted
earlier, he would have incurred living expense regardless of where he lived, and the available
evidence is that the payments he made were not in excess of what fair rental value would have
been. Thus, he incurred no cognizable losses.
43.

On July 8, 2008 the Court conducted a telephonic conference with both counsel at which

time the Court gave counsel an oral summary of its Findings and Conclusions. The Court also
told counsel that it was finalizing a written decision stating with greater specificity the Court's
analysis and determination. At that telephonic conference counsel for Petitioner asked the Court
if it had considered Petitioner's contributions regarding the vehicle and if it had considered the
issue of attorney's fees. The Court indicated that it had considered Petitioner's claims regarding
the vehicle and was not persuaded by them. The Court believes it has adequately addressed the
issue of the vehicle in these Findings of Fact, specifically, the findings reflected at note 5, supra.
The Court hereby states its intent that note 5 (as well as other footnotes to the Court's decision)
be considered fully a part of the Court's Findings of Fact. Based on those findings the Court
concludes that Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he conferred
on Respondent a measurable and particularized benefit through the occasional use of the vehicle
-20-

for family outings. Although the evidence at trial was limited at best, Petitioner conceded that
Respondent did not drive, did not have a drivers' license, and that taxis or mass transit formed
her primary means of transportation to and from work. While the family went on outings
together, the Court surmises that most of the transportation which Petitioner provided to
Respondent as part of a family activity also included Stephanie. Petitioner would have provided
transportation for himself and Stephanie in any event, so also transporting Respondent was, at
most, an incidental benefit to her. Petitioner provided no evidence of times (if any) when he
provided transportation to Respondent which he would not otherwise have incurred. In short, the
Court has no evidence before it that would allow computation of some percentage of car usage
that directly benefitted Respondent. Without that basic information the Court cannot find that
Respondent was "unjustly enriched" at Petitioner's expense. Therefore the Court declines to
credit Petitioner for the costs he incurred in maintaining and operating his vehicle during the
parties' time together.
44.

The Court does not recall the issue of attorney's fees being addressed at trial, but in any

event the Court concludes that Petitioner has no basis for asserting such a claim. As indicated
earlier, once the custody orders were entered in this case by stipulation and the Court granted
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the character of the case as a domestic
matter ended and the matter was tried as a civil claim for unjust enrichment and/or promissory
estoppel. Therefore, there was no claim for an equitable award of attorney's fees before the
Court. Moreover, even if the paternity adjudication had provided grounds for an attorney's fee
award, that adjudication was made early in the case by stipulation of the parties. Therefore, any
-21-

consideration of such fees would not have extended to include fees incurred in subsequent
litigation. Additionally, at trial Petitioner presented no evidence that would have supported an
attorney's fee award. To warrant an equitable award of attorney's fees in a domestic matter, the
party seeking such an award bears the burden of showing a financial need for such an award, and
the other party ability to afford the requested award. There was no testimony presented at trial on
any of those issues. The only evidence arguably relevant to this determination would have been
evidence that the parties had comparable levels of training and income. That is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to establish any entitlement to an attorney's fee award.
45.

Moreover, because the issue at trial involved a civil claim, rather than one brought under

divorce or paternity statutes, the American rule applies. Thus, each side is normally expected to
bear its own attorney's fees unless there is a contractual or statutory basis for an attorney's fee
award. In this case Petitioner abandoned any contract claim he may have had against Petitioner,
choosing instead to rest on equitable claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.
Petitioner has identified no other statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees.
46.

As a final matter, pursuant to the parties' earlier stipulation the terms of the Temporary

Order and Parenting Plan would become part of the permanent Paternity Order, (see Ex. 1 &3).
Because Respondent's counsel will shortly be relocating out of state, Petitioner's counsel has
agreed to assume responsibility for preparing an Order and Determination of Paternity
incorporating the stipulated terms.

-22-

ORDER
47.

Petitioner's counsel to prepare and submit for the Court's signature a final Order and

Determination of Paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
48.

With respect to all other issues addressed in this decision incorporating Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law, and Order, this shall be the final Order of the Court and no other form of
order will need to be submitted by counsel.

Entered by the Court this 9th day of July, 2009.
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Memorandum Decision,
Entered January 8, 2008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVE RICHARDS,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 064906011

:

DIANA BROWN,

:

Respondent.

:

Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation re: grant
of Partial Summary Judgment on common law marriage claim is overruled.
The

Court

has

carefully

reviewed

the

parties'

briefing

on

respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, petitioner's Objection
to the Commissioner's Recommendation, and respondent's Response.

The

Court has also reviewed the case law defining cohabitation lfi various
contexts.
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669

(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme

Court defined the term ^cohabitation" to include two key elements: common
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association.

The

Haddow case arose in the context of an ex-husband's request to terminate
alimony payments after his former spouse had allegedly "cohabited" with
another man.

The appellate court determined

boyfriend spent substantial amounts of rime m

that although

this new

the woman's home, it was

not his principal residence. Therefore, the Court held that M the common
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residency element of cohabitation ha[d] not been established."

id. at

674.
Although Haddow arose in the alimony termination context, the
{Supreme Court applied the Haddow elements in evaluating
polygamist was cohabiting with one or more women.
2004 UT 76, 99 P. 3d 820.

whether a

See, State v. Green/

In that case the trial court had determined

that Mr. Green had entered into a common-law marriage under Utah Code
Ann., § 30-1-4.5, with one of the women with whom he cohabited.

While

State v. Green, is not squarely on point with this case, the Supreme
Court's discussion of Haddow in that context persuades the Court that the
residency prong is an essential element in evaluating the point at which
the asserted common law relationship terminated.
In this case, it is undisputed that the sexual contact between the
parties terminated in 2001, and that the parties physically separated in
September 2005 when petitioner moved out of the residence.

Petitioner

did not assert his common law marriage claim until December 2005 when be
filed his Petition to establish paternity and related matters. Under In
re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P. 3d 1074, a plurality of the Utah
Supreme Court concluded that Utah Code Ann., § 30-1-4.5 required the
filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year aft^r
the termination of the relationship.

Because the latest possible date

under which the parties could have been said to have cohabited ended

m
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September 2005 when petitioner moved out, that marked the point from
which the Petition needed to have been brought.
The Court agrees with the Commissioner that, as a matter of law, the
Petition was untimely in that it was brought after the one year period
from the termination of the common law marriage relationship. Therefore,
the Commission-er's Recommendation is affirmed; Objection is overruled.
Dated this

yS day of January, 2008.

DENISE P. LI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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*** Current through the 2008 Second Special Session and the 2008 General Election ***
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(FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 1. MARRIAGE
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 (2008)
§ 30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized

(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative
order establishes that it arises out of a contract between a man and a woman who:
(a) are of legal age and capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 246, § 2; 2004, ch. 261, § 2.
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2004 amendment, effective March 23, 2004, in Subsection (1), substituted "a man and a
woman" for "two consenting parties" in the introductory clause and added "of legal age and" in Subsection (l)(a).
SEVERABILITY CLAUSES. -Laws 1987, ch. 246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chapter 246, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter is to be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Marriage, Utah Const., Art. /, Sec. 29.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Compliance.
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Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5

Effect.
Evidence.
Legal capacity of parties.
Limitation period.
Standard of proof.
Time for determination.
Cited.
COMPLIANCE.
The fact that the couple's closest friends did not consider them to be married, in conjunction with the fact that they
were not consistent in holding themselves out as married, negated the establishment of a marriage under this section.
Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
EFFECT.
This section has only prospective, and not retroactive, effect. Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
This section may not be applied retroactively. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
This section establishes "common law marriage" as a lawful form of marriage; thus, if the elements of Subsections
(l)(a) through (e) are established, then a lawful marriage may be found to have existed prior to the entry of an order by
a court or administrative body. Whyte v. Blair, 885 P. 2d 791 (Utah 1994).
EVIDENCE.
Evidence of parties' intention to continue their marriage despite having obtained a divorce was sufficient to support
the court's determination that the parties did in fact enter a common law marriage that commenced the same day as entry
of the divorce decree in their first marriage. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P. 3d 171.
LEGAL CAPACITY OF PARTIES.
A party who has entered into a valid, licensed marriage is not legally capable of entering an unsolemnized marriage
under this section. Kunz v. Kunz (In re Kunz), 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278.
LIMITATION PERIOD.
The one-year limitation period in this section is a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. Kunz v. Kunz (In
re Kunz), 2006 UT App 151, 136P.3d 1278.
STANDARD OF PROOF.
The standard of proof applicable to the establishment of facts under this section is a preponderance of evidence standard. Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P. 2d 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The proper standard of proof for adjudication of marriage under this section is preponderance of the evidence. In re
Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P. 3d 1074.
TIME FOR DETERMINATION.
The time limitation in Subsection (2) is met if a petition for adjudication is filed within one year after the termination
of the relationship. In re Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074; Greaves v. Baker, 2001 UT 45, 28 P.3d 668.
The time restriction of this section on establishing the existence of a common law marriage applies both to actions to
establish the marriage and actions seeking simultaneously to establish the marriage and obtain a divorce. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UTApp 236, 9 P.3d 171.
CITED in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1993).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
UTAH LAW REVIEW. -Recent Developments in Utah Law - Legislative Enactments - Family Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 273.
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 841 (2000).
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Turning a Blind Eye to Unmarried Cohabitants: A Look at How Utah Laws Affect Traditional Protections, 2007 Utah
L. Rev. 215.

Addendum No. 4

Rule 56 (c)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Summary Judgment Rule

Page 1

^LexisNexis*
1 of 1 DOCUMENT
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2008 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All Rights Reserved
*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1, 2008 ***
STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule 56 (200S)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule.
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to
file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
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the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty oi contempt
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997, November 1, 2004
NOTES:
Amendment Notes - The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judgment" for "move with or withoul
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor" in Subdivisions (a) and (b), in Subdivision (c), deleted "filed
and served" before "in accordance with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501", substituted "If1 for "Should it appear
to the satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision (g), and made stylistic changes throughout
Compiler's Notes ~ This rule is similar to Rule 56, F RC P
Cross-References ~ Contempt generally, §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit
— Bad faith
— Contents
— Corporation
— Experts
— Extension of time to submit
— Failure to submit
— Inconsistency with deposition
— Necessity of opposing affidavits
Resting on pleadings
— Objection
— Sufficiency
Hearsay and opinion testimony
— Superseding pleadings
— Unpleaded defenses
~ Verified pleading
— Waiver of right to contest
— When unavailable
Exclusive control of facts
— Who may make
Affirmative defense
Answers to interrogatories
Appeal
~ Adversely affected party
— Standard of review
Applicability
Attorney's fees
Availability of motion
Compliance with rule
Continuance for further discovery
Cross-motions
Damages
Discovery
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
URCP Rule 26 (2008)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods.
(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under Subdivision (a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims
or defenses, unless solely for impeachment;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for inspection and
copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such computation is based,
including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and .
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an
insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court,
the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under Subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the
parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on
the information then reasonably available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully
completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or
because another party has not made disclosures.
(2) Exemptions.
(A) The requirements of Subdivision (a)(1) and Subdivision (f) do not apply to actions:
(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $ 20,000 or less;
(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency;
(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;
(iv) to enforce an arbitration award;
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(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and .
(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel.
(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under subpart (b).
(3) Disclosure of expert testimony.
(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness
who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the
party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness
or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of
the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation
to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at
trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(3)
shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is
intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph
(3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information regarding the evidence that
it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:
(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises;
(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition and, if not
taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and .
(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. Unless
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(4) shall be made
at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may
serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another parly
under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admissibility
of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under Rules 402 and
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown.
(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclosures under
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served.
(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods:
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations;
and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the
scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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(2) A party need not provide . discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies
as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party shall expressly make any claim that the source
is not reasonably accessible, describing the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not
provided, and any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel discovery or
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions
for the discovery.
(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be
limited by the court if it determines that:
(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or.
(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may
act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. A party may obtain
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party.
Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its
subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person
making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(5) Trial preparation: Experts.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.
If a report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is
provided.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed
by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; and .
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery
to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts
and opinions from the expert.
(6) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials.
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(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and
shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of
the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving
party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving
party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party
must preserve the Information until the claim is resolved.
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to
resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be
disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court. If the motion for a proteclive order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule
37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under Subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery
from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required by Subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated
by the parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed.
Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by
deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under Subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information
thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances:
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under Subdivision (a) if the party
learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
With respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends
both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of the expert.
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(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. The following applies to all cases not exempt under Subdivision (a)(2),
except as otherwise stipulated or directed by order.
(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person or by telephone to
discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make
or arrange for the disclosures required by Subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable
information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys of
record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan.
(2) The plan shall include:
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under Subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made;
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, whether discovery
should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to particular issues;
(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, including the
form or forms in which it should be produced;
(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, including — if the parties
agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production - whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an
order;
(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules, and what other limitations should be imposed;
(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a non-party and the
identity of the non-party; and .
(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court.
(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no more than 60
days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The
proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(l)-(6), except that the date or dates
for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff
shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to
agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not
included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan.
(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 16(b).
(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery order,
unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder.
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery or response or objection
thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is not represented,
whose address shall be stated. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read
the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or
expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it
is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or objection,
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and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is signed. If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another state may
take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of
the taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the
deposition is being taken.
(i) Filing.
(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with the court,
but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery have been
served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or
unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court.
(2) A party filing a motion under Subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of
the request for discovery or the response which is at issue.
HISTORY: Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1999; April 1, 2000; November 1, 2000; November 1, 2002;
May 2, 2005; November 1, 2007
NOTES:
Objectives. The 1999 amendments to Rules 16, 26, 30, 32 and 33 comprise a new model for discovery and case
management in state court cases. The objective of the newr model is simply to better manage litigation by planning. The
amendments achieve this simple objective as follows:
1) They require the parties and encourage the judge to evaluate the case early in the process and to plan appropriate
discovery;
2) They establish default deadlines and limits to govern those cases in which the parties cannot agree to a discovery
plan and do not seek a judicial order; and
3) They require each party to disclose to other parties the names of persons with discoverable information supporting that party's claims or defenses, a description of documents supporting that party's claims or defenses, a computation
of damages and the existence of insurance agreements.
The rule changes are intended to simplify discovery and promote full disclosure of discoverable information. The
limits and deadlines specified in these rules are not intended to fit all cases. Parties should cooperate and stipulate to and
courts should consider different deadlines and limits appropriate for specific cases. The rule changes that implement
these objectives are as follows:
Discovery and Scheduling Conference of the Parties. Rule 26(f). The 1999 amendments require the parties to meet
and confer about the case as soon as practicable after commencement of the action. (The deadline for filing the stipulated discovery plan effectively limits the time for the conference to within 46 days after the first answer is filed.) To
help ensure the case does not stall, the rule imposes on plaintiffs counsel the obligation to schedule the meeting and to
submit to the court the discovery plan and order resulting from the meeting. At the meeting the parties settle what they
can and develop a discovery plan for any remaining issues. At this point the content of the discovery plan is entirely
within the control of the parties. The rule suggests elements commonly raised in the course of discovery, but counsel
should tailor the discovery plan to meet the needs of the particular case. Within 14 days after the meeting, plaintiffs
counsel prepares a stipulated discovery plan and order, which is submitted to the court for approval. If the parties cannot
agree or can only partially agree to a stipulated discovery plan, the plaintiff must and any party may move for a discov-
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ery order. If the court does not order otherwise, the default deadlines and limits of the rules govern. Discovery proceeds
in the normal course and in accordance with the discovery plan after the discovery and scheduling conference. The parties are required to meet once, but subsequent meetings, as necessary, to amend the discovery plan are not precluded.
A later-added party is bound by the discovery order but can conduct a discovery and scheduling conference to obtain a stipulated amendment to the original plan. If the parties will not stipulate to reasonable discovery by a later-added
party, the court can order appropriate relief upon motion. The court should be sensitive to the nature, extent and timing
of discovery by a later-added party.
Scheduling and Management Conference with the Court. Rule 16(b). The 1999 amendments provide that any party
can file a motion for a discovery order on issues the parties cannot agree upon, and the court will rule upon that motion.
Any party may seek a scheduling and management conference with the court, but, because of large caseloads, the rules
permit the court to decline the conference. By conducting a scheduling and management conference, however, the court
has the opportunity early in the process to evaluate the case and manage it accordingly, to explore mediation and settlement, to resolve disputes over the nature and extent of discovery, and to identify issues collateral to the litigation. It is
not anticipated that judges will manage a case contrary to the stipulation of the parties. However, the court's interest in
case management is independent of that of the parties, and the court needs the discretion independently to manage the
case, especially when the parties cannot agree.
The scheduling and management conference is designed to encourage the parties and the court to take earlier and
better control of the litigation. If possible, the trial date should be set at this conference as well as dates for all of the
necessary pretrial steps and any modifications to the presumptions established by the discovery rules.
To avoid possible confusion surrounding the multiplicity of objectives of the various conferences with the court,
the amendments delete the long list of objectives found in the former rule, which the committee determined are adequately covered under subsection (a). The objectives remain sound. The scheduling and management conference is a
particular type of conference with specified and limited objectives. Any other conference prior to trial is properly called
a pretrial conference and the objectives are more varied. In addition to the objectives in the rule itself, the following
objectives may be appropriate:
(1) forming and simplifying issues and eliminating frivolous claims and defenses;
(2) obtaining admissions of fact and stipulations to documents;
(3) obtaining stipulations or rulings on the admissibility of evidence;
(4) referring matters to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution;
(5) adopting special procedures for managing actions that may involve complex issues of fact or law, multiple parties, or unusual proof problems; and
(6) the form and substance of a pretrial order.
Required Initial Disclosures. Rule 26(a). The 1999 amendments require each party to provide to all other parties
the names of persons with discoverable information supporting that party's claims or defenses, a description of documents supporting that party's claims or defenses, a computation of any damages it claims and any insurance that may
satisfy some or all of any judgment. This exchange of information occurs within 14 days after the discovery and scheduling conference of the parties. A party can only disclose that which is known at the time. As further information is developed, the party is under a duty to supplement the initial disclosures. If a party fails to comply with the disclosure
rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless or
there is good cause for the failure. The court may order any other sanction it determines to be appropriate and Rule 37(f)
provides some examples.
Expert reports. Rule 26(a)(3). Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an expert's report need not be written
and signed by the expert. The report may be signed by the witness or the party. In addition to the qualifications of the
expert, the report must contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. In effect, the
report will serve in lieu of responses to standard interrogatories. The committee considered but decided not to adopt the
federal rule governing expert reports. Both plaintiffs' attorneys and defense attorneys reported on the high cost of reports by experts, the growth of non-practicing experts as a profession, and the need to depose experts regardless of a
written report. The expert should not be permitted to testify at variance with the report, regardless whether the expert or
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the party prepares or signs it. For this reason, the committee believes the expert should prepare and sign the report
whenever possible and should always review and approve the report. For genetics testing in paternity cases, compliance
with Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 15, Part 5 is sufficient to satisfy the expert report requirement unless a party objects
and specifically requests a report under the rule.
Exempt cases. Rule 26(a)(2). The scope of the exemption is very limited. If a case is exempt, the parties do not
need to meet and confer under Rule 26(f), and they do not need to disclose under Rule 26(a)(1). All other discovery
provisions apply to exempt cases. All information subject to mandatory disclosure in a non-exempt case is subject to
discovery using traditional methods in an exempt case. The committee did not seek to exempt simple cases. The rule
amendments benefit simple as well as complex litigation. The only exempt cases are those identified in Rule 26(a)(2).
Depositions. Rule 30. The party taking the deposition may designate and pay for any method of recording the
deposition. Any other party may designate and pay for an additional method of recording. The rule prohibits argumentative and suggestive objections.
Default Deadlines and Limits. The discovery rules establish presumptive deadlines and limits, the purpose of
which are to encourage stipulations to deadlines and limits suitable to the needs of the particular case. If the discovery
needs of the parties are not equivalent, the court, in entering a discovery order, should consider whether the presumptive
deadlines and limits are being used by one party to frustrate legitimate discovery. The discovery rules establish the following new deadlines and limits, any of which can be modified by stipulation of the parties or order of the court:
Discovery and scheduling conference
of the parties

Stipulated discovery plan and order

Required initial disclosures
Supplement required initial
disclosures
Amend response to interrogatories,
request for production or request for
admission
Initial disclosures by later added
party
Motion by later added party to amend
the discovery plan
Number of depositions oral and
written
Review and modify record of
deposition

Interrogatories
Fact discovery

Identify expert witnesses and disclose

Held as soon as practicable after
commencement of the action. (The
deadline for filing the stipulated
discovery plan effectively limits the
time for the conference to within 46
days after the first answer is filed.)
Submit to court within 14 days after
the discovery and scheduling
conference but in no event more than
60 days after the first answer is
filed.
Provide within 14 days after the
discovery and scheduling conference.
At appropriate intervals.
Seasonably.

Provide within 30 days after being
served.
File within a reasonable time after
being joined.
Ten per side.
Within 30 days after notice that
record is available but only if
deponent requested opportunity to
review record prior to completing
deposition.
No more than 25 questions, including
discrete subparts.
Begins after the parties conduct
their discovery and scheduling
conference. Closes 240 days after
first appearance by a defendant.
Within 30 days after close of fact
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expert reprots
Identify rebuttal expert and
disclose rebuttal expert reports
Deposition of expert witness
Certify that case is ready for trial
Pretrial disclosure of "will call"
and "may call" witnesses, deposition
testimony, and exhibits
Objections to pretrial disclosures
Trial

discovery.
Within 60 days after disclosure by
other party of expert identity and
report.
Conduct within 60 days after disclosure
of the expert's report.
File immediately upon the close of
all discovery.
Provide at least 30 days prior to
trial,
File within 14 days after pretrial
disclosure.
Schedule as soon after certificate of
readiness as is mutually convenient for
court and parties.

Code of Judicial Administration. Rules 4-104 and 4-502 are being repealed and the provisions of those rules are
being integrated into the Rule of Civil Procedure. The certificate of readiness for trial required by 4-104 is now in
URCP 16(b) and the restrictions on filing discovery documents with the court are now in Rule 26(i).
Amendment Notes.-- The 2005 amendment, effective May 2, 2005, added Subdivision (f)(2)(D) and made related
changes. It was approved as an expedited amendment under Rule 11-101(6)(F), subject to further change after the
comment period.
The 2007 amendment added "electronically stored information" to the list in Subdivision (a)(1)(A); added Subdivisions (b)(2), (b)(6)(B), (f)(2)(C), and (f)2)(D); inserted "to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable information" in Subdivision (f)(1); made related changes; and corrected a minor error.
Compiler's Notes. — . The Supreme Court order approving the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999.
This rule corresponds to Rule 26, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.- Admissibility of evidence, § 78-21-3; U.R.C.P. 43(a).
Continuance to permit discovery, U.R.C.P. 56(f).
Depositions upon oral examination, U.R.C.P. 30(c).
Depositions, use in court proceedings, U.R.C.P. 32.
Depositions, when taken, U.R.C.P. 30(a).
Exclusion of deposition from evidence, U.R.C.P. 32(b).
Expert and other opinion testimony, U.R.E 701 to 706.
Fee for filing notice of deposition concerning action in another state, § 78-7-35.
Liability insurance, admissibility of, U.R.E 411.
Motions, evidence on, by depositions, U.R.C.P. 43(b).
Privileges, §§ 78-24-8, 78-24-9; U.R.E 501 et seq.
Summary judgment, discovery supporting or opposing motion for, U.R.C.P. 56(e).
Terminate or limit examination, motion to, U.R.C.P. 30(d).

